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TEACHING OLD DOGS NEW TRICKS –
EMERGING TAX ISSUES FOR DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE ASSETS
AND PARTNERSHIPS
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, primarily as a result of the savings and loan crisis and
the absence of equity capital, tax advisors worked on thousands of workout transactions. In the
process, tax practitioners acquired extensive knowledge of the various issues that can arise in
connection with transactions ranging from (i) debt modifications to (ii) foreclosure (or deed in
lieu of foreclosure) transactions to (iii) partnership transactions that included exchanges of
partnership debt for newly issued equity interests in such partnerships or the contribution of
fresh capital to the troubled partnerships to facilitate restructurings of such partnerships’ balance
sheets and capital structures. The tax advisor became intimately familiar with the concept of
cancellation of indebtedness income (“COD Income”); the intricate rules of sections 108 and
1017 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code” or “IRC”); the devastation
to cash-strapped clients forced to recognize phantom income or gain as a result of a workout;
the sometimes fatal interaction of IRC sections 108, 704(b), 752 and 1274; and a bevy of other
potential traps.
Between 1991 and 1999, the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS” or “Service”), in
response to conditions on the ground and the extensive participation of the American Bar
Association Section of Taxation1 and the AICPA, promulgated numerous Revenue Procedures
and Revenue Rulings (i) to clear up certain matters (e.g., Rev. Rul. 91-312 served to clarify that,
notwithstanding the holding in Fulton Gold,3 the cancellation of a nonrecourse liability triggers
COD Income and a taxpayer cannot merely reduce his tax basis in the asset(s) secured by such
nonrecourse debt) and (ii) to provide relief and clarity in a number of other instances where the
statutory language of IRC section 108 or certain provisions of Subchapter K did not (and still do
not) provide clear rules and there were no regulations providing any meaningful guidance
regarding the proper interpretation of various statutory provisions. In addition, significant
legislative changes were made to IRC section 108 and new regulations were promulgated to
deal with the fact patterns and issues that had emerged, especially where the distressed
taxpayer was a partnership or a partner in a partnership. Appendices I, II and III hereto briefly
summarize the most important IRS pronouncements, legislative changes and regulations that
were issued or enacted to address many of these problem areas. Appendix IV hereto briefly
summarizes IRC section 108(i) that was recently enacted to allow taxpayers, under certain
circumstances, to defer COD Income recognized by them during 2009 or 2010 until 2014 and to
then recognize such COD Income (without the benefit of utilizing the exclusions contained in
IRC section 108(a)) over the ensuing five year period.
In retrospect, it was a wild, crazy and fun time to be a tax advisor and when we all
emerged from the darkness of workouts to the light of economic recovery, many of us thought
we had mastered this complex area of the tax law because we had “seen it all.” Boy were we
wrong.
The balance of this outline will not concentrate on the basics of workout transactions and
IRC section 108 planning as there are scores of articles that have been written and speakers
1

For an extensive discussion of the most salient workout tax issues that were focused upon by tax advisors during this
period, see "Report of the Section 108 Real Estate and Partnership Task Force," 46 Tax Law. 209, 216 (1992-1993).
2
1991-1 C.B. 19.
3
31 BTA 519 (1934).
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who have addressed the literally hundreds of rules that so many of us grappled with two
decades ago. Instead, this outline will focus on certain new issues and problems that have
arisen during the past few years as new transactions and fact patterns have emerged. In some
cases, the new issues can be attributed to the expanded use of limited liability companies
(“LLCs”) that were not prevalent until the promulgation of the Check-the-Box (“CTB”)
regulations.4 In other cases, today’s owners of troubled assets (REITs, private equity funds,
non-U.S. investors) differ from the typical owners of yesteryear (insolvent individuals who
developed and owned real estate projects directly or through syndicated partnerships).
The remainder of this outline will focus on the following broad categories of transactions
and issues that currently are in play:
1.
Transactions where the current owners cease to own the assets that are subject
to indebtedness that exceeds the fair market value (“FMV”) of such assets (often referred to
herein as “underwater assets”).
2.
Characterizing a liability as a recourse or nonrecourse debt for purposes of IRC
section 1001.
3.
Transactions where the taxpayer recognizes that it will not recoup its equity
investment with respect to the underwater asset and seeks to recognize its inherent loss in the
most tax efficient manner.
4.
Finally, the last section of this outline contains a discussion of the key rules of
Subchapter K that can apply to partnerships that own underwater assets (including the manner
in which COD Income recognized by such a partnership may be allocated among its partners),
transactions pursuant to which creditors become partners in troubled partnerships, and certain
collateral consequences that should be taken into account in structuring transactions on behalf
of underwater partnerships and their partners.

4
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WHAT HAPPENS IF A DEBT CANNOT BE WORKED OUT – VOLUNTARY AND
INVOLUNTARY FORECLOSURES AND OTHER DISPOSITIONS OF PROPERTY
A.
Introduction. If a debtor and creditor are unable to reach an agreement to
modify or otherwise restructure a troubled loan, typically one of two scenarios will unfold: (1) if
the debtor wishes to retain the troubled asset it may seek bankruptcy protection and hope that a
satisfactory plan can be formulated that will leave it with possession and control over its
property, or (2) if the debtor is not willing (or able) to affirmatively utilize the bankruptcy laws, the
property will be acquired by the creditor pursuant to a consensual agreement, a foreclosure sale
or a bankruptcy filing. This section will focus on the general tax rules that are applicable to
voluntary and involuntary dispositions of real property and offer several planning suggestions.
The tax consequences of these transactions will depend on how the transaction and the debt
are characterized for federal income tax purposes because the characterization accorded to
the transaction will affect the character of the income and/or loss that must be recognized by
the debtor (and its partners) in connection with the disposition. To the extent that COD Income
arises as a result of a workout transaction, such income will be taxed as ordinary income (at the
highest marginal rates) except to the extent that (i) such income can be excluded under IRC
section 108 (most typically under IRC section 108(a)(1)(A) (the bankruptcy exclusion),
108(a)(1)(B) (the insolvency exclusion) or 108(a)(1)(D) and 108(c) (the qualified real property
indebtedness exclusion for solvent individuals and S corporations)), or (ii) such income can be
offset with (A) losses of the taxpayer from the current taxable year (or net operating losses from
past years that have been carried forward), (B) suspended passive activity losses, or (C) other
tax attributes of the taxpayer. On the other hand, if the taxpayer is an individual and recognizes
a capital loss1 in connection with the transaction, such loss may prove to be of only limited value
since it cannot be carried back and can be used only if the taxpayer recognizes capital gains
during the current year or a future year. Characterization and character will also be crucial
with respect to the other matters discussed in the succeeding sections of this outline.
B.

Sale or Exchange Treatment.

1.
General Overview. Voluntary and involuntary dispositions of property,
including dispositions occurring pursuant to foreclosure proceedings and deeds in lieu of
foreclosure, constitute sales or exchanges for federal income tax purposes.2 Any such
disposition, therefore, will likely result in the recognition of gain or loss by the debtor. The
amount of such gain or loss will be determined by comparing the proceeds realized by the
debtor with the debtor's adjusted tax basis in the property “sold.”3 The key determination,
therefore, is the amount of proceeds that will be deemed realized by the debtor as a result of the
disposition. The answer will depend on several factors, the most important of which are (1)
whether the debt that encumbers the property constitutes recourse or nonrecourse debt for
purposes of IRC section 1001, and (2) the FMV of the property at the time of the disposition.

1

Losses may be ordinary under IRC section 1231. Ordinary losses claimed under IRC section 1231 may be recaptured
as ordinary income in later years under IRC section 1231 (c).
2
See Helvering v. Hammel, 41-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9169 (S.Ct. 1941); 2925 Briarpark, Ltd., v. Commissioner, 163 F.3d 313 (5th
Cir. 1999); Rev. Rul. 73-36, 1973-1 C.B. 372; Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(1); see generally Witt & Lyons, “An Examination
of the Tax Consequences of Discharge of Indebtedness,” 10 Va. Tax Rev. 1, 4 (1990), at 57-63; Kalteyer, “Real Estate
Workouts - Original Issue Discount Implications of Troubled Debt Restructurings,” 43 Tax Law. 579 (Spring 1990), at 579;
Lipton, “Briarpark and the Unexpected Limits to Careful Tax Planning,” 90 J. Tax'n 198 (April 1999).
3
IRC section 1001(a). If the mortgagor has a right of redemption, the gain or loss realized on the foreclosure will not be
recognized until the right of redemption period expires. See Rev. Rul. 70-63, 1970-1 C.B. 36.
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2.

Dispositions of Property Subject to Nonrecourse Debt.

a.
General. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Tufts, it is
well settled that the amount realized upon the disposition of a property subject to a nonrecourse
liability will always be at least equal to the amount of such liability.4 Thus, if property subject to a
nonrecourse liability is foreclosed upon or voluntarily conveyed by the debtor, such debtor will
recognize gain or loss5 equal to the difference between (1) the amount of the liability (plus the
amount of cash and the FMV of any other property paid to the debtor) and (2) the debtor's
adjusted tax basis in the property immediately before the disposition. No portion of the debtor's
gain will constitute COD Income under these circumstances and, therefore, IRC section 108 and
the potential for relief provided thereunder will be totally unavailable.6 It has been suggested
that, where the debtor who owns an underwater property is insolvent and wishes to avail himself
of the benefits of IRC section 108, a taxpayer might (1) convert the debt into recourse debt prior
to the disposition (presumably with an understanding that any deficiency amount will be forgiven
by the creditor),7 (2) sell the collateral to a third party with the consent of the creditor, with the
debtor paying the sales proceeds to the creditor in exchange for a full release of the debt, or (3)
obtain a discharge of a portion of the debt in exchange for a cash payment to the creditor and
then transferring the property to the creditor in satisfaction of the debt.8 Each of these
suggestions appears to be susceptible of being attacked on a number of grounds, including step
transaction principles.9 Scenario (2) is addressed immediately below.
b.
Functional equivalent of foreclosure – Briarpark. In 2925
Briarpark, Ltd. v. Commissioner,10 the taxpayer, a limited partnership, acquired land and
constructed an office building thereon. The land and building were encumbered by a
nonrecourse loan made by a bank, a portion of the loan being personally guaranteed by the
taxpayer’s general partner.
In 1989, when the amount owing in respect of the debt substantially exceeded the FMV
of the land and building, the taxpayer, at the request of the bank, offered the assets for sale.
Several months later, when the loan was in default, the taxpayer sold the property to a third
party, which third party conditioned its purchase on the removal of all encumbrances on the
property (particularly the liens held by the bank). The bank agreed to release its liens with three
provisos: (i) that the net sales proceeds be paid to the bank; (ii) that the general partner make a
cash payment to the bank in respect of his partial guarantee of the loan (such cash payment
4

See also IRC section 7701(g); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-2(a)(1), 1.1001-2(c) Examples (6) and (7); Estate of Delman v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979).
5
Such gain or loss may be ordinary income or loss, capital gain or loss or IRC section 1231 gain or loss depending on the
facts.
6
The taxpayer's gain (if any) may constitute gain from a passive activity, however, which can be offset if the taxpayer has
otherwise suspended passive activity losses. It has been suggested that foreclosures and other dispositions of property
encumbered by nonrecourse debt should be analyzed in the same manner as similar transactions where the debt is
recourse to the owner, as discussed, infra. Under this analysis, the sales proceeds would be limited to the actual FMV of
the property and the debt in excess of such value would be treated as COD Income. See Blanchard, “Discharge of
Nonrecourse Debt: A Reexamination of the Distinction Between Recourse and Nonrecourse Debt and Related Issues,”
50 Tax Notes 773 (Feb. 18, 1991); Blanchard, 51 Tax Notes 1461 (June 17, 1991). It is unlikely that many taxpayers have
taken this position.
7
The conversion of a liability from nonrecourse to recourse should not cause the taxpayer to be deemed to have sold the
underwater asset provided that there is no agreement that the creditor will forgive the deficiency amount. This begs the
question, of course, why the taxpayer would agree to undertake personal liability with regard to an undersecured loan.
8
See Witt & Lyons, supra footnote 2, at 61.
9
But see Danenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 370 (1979), acq., 1980-2 C.B. 1; T.A.M. 8005002 (Oct. 11, 1979).
10
163 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 1990), aff’g., 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 3218 (1997).
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being less than five percent of the portion of the loan guaranteed by him); and (iii) that the
partnership’s cash reserves be paid to the bank.
The taxpayer took the position on its tax return that the transaction resulted in
approximately $14.5 million of COD Income and a net loss of $61,245 whereas the Service took
the position that the transaction resulted merely in gain to the taxpayer and that the taxpayer did
not realize any COD Income.
The resolution of the issue presented to the court essentially came down to how the
transaction should be characterized for tax purposes. The Tax Court noted that the sale of the
property, with the proceeds being paid to the bank, had the “same practical effect as several
other transactions which have been held to be a ‘sale or exchange’.” These transactions
included an involuntary foreclosure sale;11 a reconveyance of property subject to a nonrecourse
loan;12 an abandonment of property subject to a nonrecourse loan;13 and a deed in lieu of
foreclosure.14 The Tax Court then held (and the Fifth Circuit concurred) that the Briarpark
partnership transaction was the functional equivalent of the foregoing transactions and that the
fact that the bank did not acquire title to the property was immaterial.15 In so holding, the court
distinguished Gershkowitz v. Commissioner,16 which held that the settlement of a nonrecourse
loan at a discount resulted in COD Income to the borrower where the borrower sold the property
three months later. The key difference between Gershkowitz and Briarpark is that in Briarpark
the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit found a single transaction whereby the property was deemed
sold subject to the entire debt secured thereby, whereas in Gershkowitz the sale occurred at a
later date in an independent transaction (with the taxpayer retaining title to the property in
question after the debt in question had been discharged).
There are a few other interesting aspects of the Tax Court’s holding in Briarpark. First,
two years prior to the sale transaction, the bank agreed to convert the loan from a recourse to a
nonrecourse obligation. At such time, it appears that the existing loan balance exceeded the
FMV of the property. The taxpayer argued that the conversion of the loan from a recourse to a
nonrecourse obligation resulted in COD Income to the taxpayer at such time. The court rejected
this alternative argument, chiefly on the ground that the bank, which also advanced new funds
to the taxpayer to fund tenant improvements, intended to enforce all of its rights under the loan
following the conversion. Second, the court observed, without analysis, that there was not any
identifiable event indicating the taxpayer had abandoned the property on or before the
conversion of the loan from a recourse to a nonrecourse loan. It would appear that, while neither
the court nor the taxpayer was directly asking the question of whether the bank had become the
owner of the property for tax purposes, implicitly the court was holding that neither the
conversion of the loan from recourse to nonrecourse nor the fact that the loan balance
significantly exceeded the FMV of the property caused the taxpayer to cease to be the owner of
the property for tax purposes. This theme will be further explored in several other contexts in the
discussion that follows.17

11

Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941).
Allen v. Commissioner, 856 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir. 1986).
13
Yarbro v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1984).
14
Laport v. Commissioner, 671 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1982); Freeland v. Commissioner. 74 T.C. 970 (1980).
15
Sands v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1997-146.
16
88 T.C. 984 (1987).
17
For a further discussion of Briarpark, see Lipton, “Briarpark and the Unexpected Limits to Careful Tax Planning,” 90 J.
Tax’n 198 (April 1999).
12
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c.
Other Thoughts Regarding Constructive Foreclosure. One of
the issues that permeates real estate workout and distress situations is at what point in time the
tax owner of an underwater asset should be deemed to cease to own such asset in the absence
of an actual conveyance of title to the asset to the lender, a designee of the lender or a third
party purchaser or transferee of the asset. Set forth below are several questions and
observations related to this issue:
1.
A mere decline in the value of the collateral without more does not cause a
realization event to occur.18
2.
Can the substantial modification of an undersecured debt cause the asset to be
deemed transferred to the creditor?19
3.
Are there circumstances where a substantial change in the value of the collateral,
in combination with other events (modification of the debt that includes a substantial increase in
the “economic rights” of the lender and/or additional involvement of the lender in the monitoring
or operation of the asset), are sufficient to create a realization event?20
4.
Do actions taken by the debtor or its partners (e.g., claiming worthlessness
deductions) impact the realization question?
d.
Nonrecourse Debt Guaranteed by a Partner. If the property
foreclosed upon is subject to debt that is nonrecourse to the partnership but guaranteed by a
partner, it is not clear that the debt will be treated as nonrecourse debt for purposes of IRC
section 1001. At least two commentators have expressed the view that, based upon Tufts, the
partnership should recognize gain measured by the full amount of the debt (i.e., that the debt
should be treated as nonrecourse for purposes of IRC section 1001), and the release of the
guarantor-partner(s) should be ignored.21
3.
Dispositions of Property Subject to Recourse Debt. In the event a
property subject to a recourse debt is foreclosed upon by, or voluntarily conveyed to, a creditor,
the transaction must be carefully scrutinized to determine the amount and character of the
taxpayer's income or loss. As noted above, in these situations there are two transactions taking
18

See Proesel v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 992 (1981).
Prop. Reg. § 1.1001-3(f)(7)(ii) is intended to answer this question in the negative. For a discussion of this proposed
regulation, including whether the proposed regulation in fact ensures that the substantial modification of an underwater
loan will not be treated as transferring tax ownership of the troubled asset to the creditor, see Lipton, “Proposed
Regulations Address Impact of a Decline in Debt Issuer’s Financial Status under Debt Modification Regulations – or Do
They?”, Vol. 13, No. 4 J. Passthrough Entities 7 (July-August 2010). For further discussion on this question, see Sugin,
“Nonrecourse Debt Revisited, Restructured and Redefined,” 51 Tax L. Rev. 115, 142-145 (1995).
20
L&C Springs Associates v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. 928 (1997), aff’d, 188 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 1999); Carlins v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. 228 (1988); Cozzi v. Commmissioner, 88 T.C. 435 (1987); Brountas v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
1062 (1980), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 692 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1982); aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other
grounds sub. nom., CRC Corp. v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106 (1983). For a
more thorough analysis of these issues, see Sowell, “Worthless Partnership Interests,” 44 Tax Mgmt. Memo. 480 (Nov.
17, 2003).
21
See Reeves and Shapleigh, “Effect of Discharge of Indebtedness Income on Partnerships and Partners,” 8 J.
Partnership Tax. 18, 26-27 (Spring 1991). The authors question this conclusion since the debt is not pure nonrecourse
debt and the issue has not been fully addressed by the Service or resolved by the courts. Consequently, in these
scenarios, it is conceivable that taxpayers may characterize the debt (as recourse or nonrecourse) depending upon a
variety of factors, including the solvency of the partners, the amount of the debt and the partnership’s adjusted tax basis in
its assets.
19
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place: (i) a taxable disposition of the property, and (ii) to the extent the FMV of the property is
less than the outstanding balance of the recourse debt, either the taxpayer continues to be
liable to the creditor (in the amount of the deficiency), or the remainder of the liability that was
not satisfied by the conveyance of the property is discharged by the creditor. Under this
approach, the taxpayer must recognize gain or loss equal to the difference between the FMV of
the property and the taxpayer's adjusted tax basis therein immediately prior to the disposition. If
the remainder of the debt is forgiven as part of the transaction, the amount forgiven will
constitute COD Income that, unless one of the exclusions provided by IRC section 108 is
applicable, will be included in the taxpayer's gross income. The transaction thus must be
bifurcated to analyze these two distinct transactions.
a.
Case Law. The case law regarding whether foreclosures or other
dispositions of property subject to recourse debt should be bifurcated in the manner described
above is divided. In Chilingirian v. Commissioner,22 the debtor was held to have realized sales
proceeds that included the full amount of certain first lien recourse debt secured by his property
upon the foreclosure of such property by the second lienholder. Significantly, it is unclear from
the facts reported in Chilingirian whether the FMV of the property was greater or less than the
debt secured thereby. In addition, it appears that neither the Service nor the taxpayer argued,
nor did the court consider, whether the foreclosure transaction should be bifurcated to
determine the true nature of the taxpayer's income. In Aizawa v. Commissioner,23 the Tax Court
held that the amount realized by the taxpayer on a foreclosure sale of real property subject to a
recourse liability was limited to the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, where the taxpayer
remained liable for the balance of the debt. Aizawa left unanswered whether the Tax Court
might apply Tufts where the taxpayer conveys his property to a recourse lender in full
satisfaction of the debt. The Tax Court subsequently addressed this question in Frazier v.
Commissioner.24 In Frazier, the court applied the reasoning in Tufts and determined that the
true FMV of property subject to a recourse liability and transferred in foreclosure should be
treated as the amount realized and that the excess should be treated as COD Income.25
b.
Rev. Rul. 90-16. As a result of this division, certain regional
offices of the Service took the position that a foreclosure or voluntary conveyance of property in
full satisfaction of recourse debt was governed by Tufts, with the amount realized being equal to
the full amount of the recourse debt. The Service responded to these wayward agents by
issuing Rev. Rul. 90-16,26 which makes it clear that a disposition of property secured by a
recourse liability must be analyzed in accordance with the bifurcation method set forth in Treas.
Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(2) regardless of whether the recourse liability is fully satisfied as an integral
part of the conveyance.
c.
Partially Recourse Debt. If the secured debt is partially
recourse, the Service takes the position that a transfer of cash or the collateral to the creditor in
satisfaction of the debt will be allocated first to the nonrecourse portion of the debt in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary.27 As a result, if the FMV of the property transferred to
the creditor is less than the nonrecourse portion of the debt, the sales proceeds realized by the
22

T.C.M. 1986-463, aff’d, 918 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1990).
99 T.C. 197 (1992), aff’d, 29 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1994).
24
111 T.C. 243 (1998).
25
See Lupi Sher, “Frazier: Revenue Rulings Should Have Some Fair Market Value,” 81 Tax Notes 687 (November 9,
1998).
26
1990-1 C.B. 12.
27
See T.A.M. 8348001.
23
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debtor will equal the nonrecourse portion of the debt, and the recourse portion of the debt will be
deemed forgiven and will constitute COD Income.
d.
Conversion of Recourse Debt to Nonrecourse Debt. In some
cases, a loan workout will result in the conversion of a recourse debt into a nonrecourse debt.
Under Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(5)(ii), such a conversion typically will result in a substantial
modification of the debt and the deemed issuance of a new debt instrument in exchange for the
old debt instrument. In general, such a deemed exchange should not result in COD Income
provided the instruments are not publicly-traded and the issue price of the new note is at least
equal to the adjusted issue price of the original note. This assumes, of course, that following the
modification, the debt is still treated as debt for tax purposes, and there has not been a
constructive foreclosure or other deemed transfer of the asset to the creditor. In Briarpark,
supra, as noted above, the conversion of debt from recourse to nonrecourse did not trigger
either COD Income to the borrower or a constructive abandonment of the assets, even though
the FMV of the assets was less than the outstanding loan balance, because the creditor
continued to view itself as a creditor following the conversion.
4.
IRC section 1001.

Characterizing Debt as Recourse or Nonrecourse for Purposes of

a.
General Rule – State Law Controls the Determination. As
explained further below, the classification of a debt as recourse or nonrecourse will have
significant implications in connection with a foreclosure sale or other disposition of an
underwater property. While IRC section 1001 does not provide any guidance regarding when a
debt should be characterized as recourse or nonrecourse, the prevailing view of tax advisors is
that the determination of whether a liability is recourse or nonrecourse for purposes of IRC
section 1001 generally turns on how the liability is characterized under the controlling state
law.28 One commentator recently noted, however, that the Service apparently believes that the
characterization of a liability for purposes of IRC section 1001 should be based on IRC section
752 principles.29 If the proper standard for making the recourse/nonrecourse determination is
the characterization of the debt under state law, then the recourse/nonrecourse determination
should not be difficult where the debtor is a general partnership, limited partnership or LLC that
is treated as a partnership for federal income tax purposes because the recourse/nonrecourse
determination will turn solely on whether, under the terms of the loan documents, the creditor’s
rights are limited to specified assets that secure the debt (nonrecourse liability for IRC section
1001 purposes) or whether the creditor can pursue all of the debtor’s assets in the event the
loan is not repaid (recourse liability for IRC section 1001 purposes). Put another way, under the
terms of the controlling loan documents and state law, may the creditor reach all of the assets
owned by the borrower and may the creditor use the bankruptcy laws to enforce its rights
against the borrower?
b.
The Plot Thickens – Single Member LLCs. If the LLC has only
one owner/member and does not file a CTB election, such LLC (“SMLLC”) will be disregarded
28

See Rubin, Whiteway and Finkelstein, “Treatment of Liabilities as Recourse or Nonrecourse in a Complex Financial
World,” 13 J. Passthrough Entities 29 (July-August 2010); see also Burke, “Exculpatory Liabilities and Partnership
Nonrecourse Allocations,” 57 Tax Law. 33, at 37 (Fall 2003); Starr, Case, Garre-Lohnes, Rosenberg, Schmalz and
Crnkovich, “Limited Liability Companies,” 752-2nd Tax Management Portfolio (BNA) A-45 (2010).
29
2010 TNT 186-22 (Sept. 17, 2010), citing two non-binding IRS pronouncements, FSA 200028019 (July 14, 2000) and
NSAR 020142 (Feb. 26, 2002). This issue will be focused upon in detail below in connection with the discussion of the
Tax Court’s decision in Great Plains Gasification, 92 T.C.M. 534 (2006).
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for federal income tax purposes and its assets and liabilities will be treated as owned/owing by
the sole member. The sole member, however, generally will not be liable for such debt (absent
a guarantee or similar contractual undertaking). In these instances, special analysis is needed
to determine if the debt of the SMLLC is to be treated as recourse or nonrecourse debt for
purposes of IRC sections 1001 and 7701(g).30 Unfortunately, neither of these sections nor the
regulations thereunder provide any definition or guidance regarding when debt owing by a state
law partnership or an LLC should be treated as recourse or nonrecourse debt for purposes of
these sections. While the regulations issued pursuant to IRC sections 704(b) and 752 define
recourse, nonrecourse and partner nonrecourse liabilities for purposes of allocating a
partnership’s income, loss and debt among its partners, such regulations would appear to be
irrelevant for purposes of characterizing debt as recourse or nonrecourse for purposes of IRC
sections 1001 and 7701(g).31 As noted above, while there is some commentary addressing this
issue (with conclusions drawn in relatively straightforward fact patterns),32 there is no helpful
authority addressing the more complex fact patterns that are illustrated below.
c.

Illustrative LLC Fact Patterns.33

(1)
Nonrecourse Loan to SMLLC. SMLLC borrows money
from Bank on a fully nonrecourse basis. The loan is secured by one or more assets owned by
SMLLC. Bank’s sole recourse is against the asset(s) owned by SMLLC and Bank cannot reach
other assets owned by the taxpayer (the owner of SMLLC). This loan should be characterized
as nonrecourse debt for purposes of IRC section 1001.
(2)
Nonrecourse Loan to SMLLC Guaranteed by Owner of
SMLLC. Same facts as above but the owner of SMLLC personally guarantees the nonrecourse
loan. Because Bank can pursue the owner and enforce its rights against owner’s other assets,
such loan should be characterized as a recourse debt for purposes of IRC section 1001.
(3)
Recourse Loan to SMLLC. SMLLC borrows money from
Bank and is personally liable to repay the loan. SMLLC owns a single real estate asset. Under
state law, SMLLC can be sued by Bank if it defaults under the loan and Bank can pursue all
remedies available to it under the applicable state law, including the filing of a bankruptcy
petition against SMLLC. Bank cannot sue the owner of SMLLC nor may Bank reach any of such
owner’s other assets to satisfy Bank’s claims against SMLLC. This is a more difficult fact
pattern. Some tax advisors are of the view that the loan should be viewed as nonrecourse for
purposes of IRC section 1001 on the theory that the SMLLC is a disregarded entity and the
lender cannot seek to enforce its rights against the taxpayer (the owner of SMLLC) pursuant to
a bankruptcy proceeding . Other advisors are of the view that the answer may depend on
whether the owner of SMLLC owns other assets or has the right to acquire other assets under
the operative documents and agreements. If the owner of SMLLC is precluded from acquiring
30
IRC section 7701(g) codifies the Supreme Court’s decision in Commissioner v. Tufts, 83-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 9328 (S.Ct. 1983)
and provides that in determining the gain or loss with respect to an asset, the FMV of the asset is not less than the
amount of any nonrecourse debt to which the asset is subject.
31
But see Great Plains Gasification Associates v. Commissioner, discussed infra; see also footnote 5, supra, and the
accompanying text suggesting that the Service may believe that the rules of IRC sections 704(b) and 752 are relevant in
characterizing debt as recourse or nonrecourse debt for purposes of IRC section 1001.
32
See Rubin, supra, at 34-36.
33
These examples are merely illustrative of the problem as there are countless other fact patterns that pose similar
difficulties of analysis. The conclusions expressed herein assume that state law governs the recourse/nonrecourse
determination.
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additional assets, these advisors believe that the loan may be viewed as recourse to the
taxpayer on the theory that Bank has the right and ability to reach all of the assets of the
taxpayer (the owner of SMLLC) even though Bank cannot actually sue the taxpayer or file a
bankruptcy petition against the taxpayer. On the other hand, if the owner of SMLLC has other
assets that cannot be reached by Bank, the consensus view appears to be that the recourse
loan to SMLLC should be treated as a nonrecourse liability for purposes of IRC section 1001.
(4)
Recourse Loan to Regarded LLC that Owns Single
Asset and is Prohibited from Owning Other Assets. LLC (taxed as a partnership) borrows
money from Bank and acquires a real estate asset. LLC (but not its members) has full personal
liability to repay the loan. Under the LLC agreement and the controlling loan documents, LLC is
prohibited from acquiring any other assets. If LLC defaults on the loan, Bank can pursue all
remedies available to it under state law, including the filing of a bankruptcy petition against LLC.
Bank cannot sue the members of LLC nor may Bank reach any of the members’ other assets to
satisfy its claims against LLC.
Once again, there is not unanimity among tax advisors as to whether the loan is
recourse or nonrecourse for purposes of IRC section 1001. Some advisors are of the view that,
because Bank can sue LLC (the taxpayer) and pursue relief under the bankruptcy laws, the loan
should be treated as recourse for purposes of IRC section 1001, while other advisors believe
that the loan should be considered nonrecourse for such purposes because in substance Bank
can only reach the single real estate asset owned by LLC.
This fact pattern is similar to the fact pattern considered by the Tax Court in Great Plains
Gasification, a controversial and perplexing decision that is discussed immediately below.
d.
Great Plains Gasification. In Great Plains Gasification, the Tax
Court considered whether debt owing by a partnership that was discharged as part of a
foreclosure proceeding was recourse or nonrecourse debt. Great Plains Gasification has
created a great deal of consternation among tax professionals34 because of the reasoning
employed by the Tax Court in concluding that the debt in question was nonrecourse debt.
In Great Plains Gasification, the partnership incurred approximately $1.5 billion of debt to
build a coal gasification plant. Such loan was secured by a mortgage on the partnership’s
assets and was guaranteed by the Department of Energy (“DOE”). The parent corporation of
one of the partnership’s general partners pledged shares of stock of one of its subsidiaries
(“Pledged Shares”) to secure the DOE guaranty. The partnership defaulted on the loan, the
DOE paid off the loan and the DOE eventually foreclosed on the plant, bidding in $1.0 billion for
the partnership’s pledged assets. The DOE released the partnership from the remaining debt
when it acquired title to the Pledged Shares.
In holding that the entire debt was discharged as a result of the foreclosure, the Tax
Court stated that “the debt was in substance nonrecourse against the partnership and the
partners,” and, therefore, the sales proceeds received by the partnership on the foreclosure
included the entire debt.
In Great Plains Gasification, the Tax Court addressed other issues that have not
garnered as much attention as its analysis of the recourse v. nonrecourse question. One of
34

See Rubin, supra.
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these issues was whether the partnership abandoned the project prior to the foreclosure sale. In
finding that the facts did not support the Service’s argument that an abandonment had occurred,
the court observed that the question of abandonment is “inherently a factual matter” (citing L&C
Springs), and noted that while a determination of abandonment typically requires both an intent
to abandon the asset and an “affirmative act” of abandonment, the overt act of abandonment is
not needed when the abandonment would result in the taxpayer recognizing income if “it is clear
for all practical purposes that the taxpayer will not retain the property” (again citing L&C
Springs).35
In L&C Springs, the Seventh Circuit considered the point at which the taxpayer should
be deemed to have abandoned property and recognized COD Income under IRC section 1001.
The taxpayer argued the abandonment took place in 1991 when the property was sold pursuant
to a foreclosure proceeding while the Service argued that the abandonment occurred in 1990
when the lender acquired effective control over the property but had not yet acquired legal title
thereto. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision that the abandonment occurred
in the earlier year, such decision being based on the default by the taxpayer on the debt, the
taxpayer’s failure to pay property taxes, and the lender taking over control and management of
the property. The subsequent passage of legal title to the lender was deemed a “mere formality.
The Tax Court then turned to the recourse/nonrecourse issue and stated that such
determination is made at the partnership level and that debt is generally treated as nonrecourse
if the creditor’s remedies are limited to specifically pledged assets and as recourse if the creditor
may reach all of the debtor’s assets (citing Raphan v. U.S.36). Interestingly, Raphan addressed
the allocation of debt among partners under IRC section 752, and the Raphan decision led to
the amendment of the IRC section 752 regulations in 1988. Importantly, Raphan did not
address, and would appear to have no relevance in characterizing, debt for purposes of IRC
section 1001 (which, as noted above, governs sales of assets, including sales pursuant to
foreclosure proceedings).
After opening the door by referring to Raphan, the Tax Court in Great Plains Gasification
proceeded to rely on Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (which was in effect when the transactions at
issue occurred) to define a partnership liability as nonrecourse where “none of the partners have
any personal liability.” The court then noted that the partnership in question had no significant
assets other than the coal plant and that under the controlling documents it was not authorized
to acquire other assets or engage in any other business. The court then concluded that the
liability was in substance nonrecourse (under the prior version of Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e))
because the partnership’s liability was effectively limited to the project assets and the partners’
liability was limited to their partnership interests. Perhaps more importantly, the court also noted
in a footnote that the taxpayer did not argue that the debt should be considered recourse by
virtue of the pledge of the Pledged Shares.
It appears that the taxpayer did not seek to characterize the debt as recourse because
its tax objectives did not relate to the character of income recognized as a result of the
foreclosure and pledge transactions, but rather related to the timing of such income recognition
(the taxpayer sought to defer recognizing a substantial portion of its gain until the following year
when it formally transferred the Pledged Shares in respect of its guaranty).

35
36

Issues related to abandonment and worthlessness are discussed infra.
759 F.2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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The question that must be asked following the Tax Court’s decision in Great Plains
Gasification is what relevance does this decision have going forward for purposes of
characterizing debt as recourse or nonrecourse for purposes of IRC section 1001. Is the holding
simply wrong because the debt was recourse to all of the assets of the partnership under state
law (an argument that was not advanced by the parties)?37 Was the decision wrong because the
lender could also reach the Pledged Shares? Is the decision irrelevant because it relied on IRC
section 752 principles that appear to be irrelevant for purposes of IRC section 1001? Or is Great
Plains Gasification important because it suggests that, in substance, the loan in question was
nonrecourse because the partnership had “no significant assets apart from the project” and “the
partnership was not authorized to acquire nonproject assets or to engage in any business other
than the project.”38 While it is impossible to answer these questions at this time, it appears that,
following Great Plains Gasification, the questions of whether other assets can be reached by a
creditor, and whether a borrower has the right to acquire other non-pledged assets, may need to
be asked and answered.
5.
Determining FMV. In the absence of clear and convincing proof to the
contrary, the FMV of property that is foreclosed upon will be the amount bid in for such property
at the foreclosure proceeding.39 On the other hand, if the debtor voluntarily transfers the
property to the creditor, it will be more difficult to establish the FMV of the property. In the latter
case, to establish the FMV of the property, the debtor should enter into an agreement with the
creditor that sets forth the agreed upon FMV of the property. Such agreements, of course, are
not binding on the Service. Moreover, in many instances the creditor will not agree to enter into
an agreement specifying the FMV of the collateral. To avoid these potential problems, the
debtor should obtain an appraisal of the property, and report the transaction in a manner that is
consistent with such appraisal.

37

See Rubin, supra, at 35.
Great Plains Gasification, supra, at 28.
39
Treas. Reg. § 1.166-6(b)(2); see Community Bank v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 503 (1974), acq. in result, 1975-1 C.B. 1.
38
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LIKE-KIND EXCHANGE ON THE EVE OF FORECLOSURE
In a bit of déjà vue, the question has recently been raised whether a taxpayer who owns
an asset that is encumbered by a nonrecourse liability that exceeds the FMV of the asset may
transfer such asset as part of a like-kind exchange transaction. Transactions of this nature were
effected in the early 1990s and the Service, at least informally at such time, questioned whether
an asset with “negative equity” could in fact be a relinquished property for purposes of IRC
section 1031.
It is understood that these transactions have reemerged and, thus, the question has
arisen once again as to whether such an asset may be disposed of through a qualified
intermediary (“QI”) with a view to effect a like-kind exchange transaction and avoid the
recognition of taxable gain inherent in the underwater asset. Such taxable gain would be equal
to the excess of (i) the nonrecourse liability owing by the taxpayer with respect to the asset over
(ii) the taxpayer’s adjusted tax basis in such asset. In these cases, the taxpayer, prior to the
foreclosure or deed in lieu of foreclosure event, transfers the asset to QI subject to the debt, QI
acquires replacement property designated by the taxpayer, the replacement property is direct
deeded to the taxpayer, and subsequently the relinquished property is foreclosed upon or
otherwise transferred to the nonrecourse lender. It is critical to note that, to permit QI to acquire
the replacement property, the taxpayer will likely have to transfer to QI the cash needed by QI to
acquire the replacement property (the balance of the purchase price for the replacement
property being funded with debt encumbering such property, either newly issued debt or existing
debt that would continue to be secured by the replacement property). Such cash would be
furnished by the taxpayer in the manner contemplated by Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2.
The key question, of course, is whether transactions of this type will be respected
according to their form. Set forth below is a brief summary of the key issues and arguments that
bear upon these transactions.
1.
Is the Underwater Asset Property for Purposes of IRC section 1031? Does
the relinquished property constitute “property” for purposes of IRC section 1031? This question
squarely asks whether an asset in which the taxpayer has “negative equity” can be treated as
property for purposes of IRC section 1031. It does not appear that there is any authority that has
directly considered this issue. Neither the language of IRC section 1031 nor its legislative
history appears to limit its application to exchanges involving non-troubled properties. In the
early 1990s, IRS representatives made public statements that a like-kind exchange on the eve
of a foreclosure appeared to be an abusive transaction and that regulations might be
promulgated to deny such exchanges tax-free treatment under IRC section 1031. While the
Service never issued any such regulations under IRC section 1031, the Service did propose
regulations under IRC sections 332, 351 and 368 regarding the treatment of transactions under
those sections where the property being transferred is subject to liabilities in excess of the FMV
of such property.1 In general, the proposed regulations provide that a transfer of such property is
not entitled to nonrecognition treatment. The Service has indicated that it recognizes the
principles set forth in the proposed regulations could be applied to other provisions of the Code.
Accordingly, it is possible that the Service ultimately may extend this approach to IRC section
1031. While there are not many authorities addressing transfers of underwater assets or
1
70 Fed. Reg. 11903 (March 10, 2005). For a thorough discussion of these proposed regulations, see Blanchard, Hooker
and Vogel, “Underwater Assets and Insolvent Corporations: Reflections on Treasury’s Recently Proposed Regulations
and Related Matters,” 59 Tax Law. 107 (Fall 2005).
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insolvent businesses, IRC section 351 implicitly has been held to apply to the incorporation of
an insolvent sole proprietorship where the business was continued following the incorporation.2
In the IRC section 1031 context, the following arguments might be advanced to support
like-kind treatment where the relinquished property has “negative equity”: (i) the asset is not
worthless – it is merely subject to debt in excess of the gross FMV of such asset; (ii) the
purpose of IRC section 1031 is to permit taxpayers to roll their built-in gain into a like-kind
replacement property whereas IRC sections 351 and 721 appear to require the taxpayertransferor to receive stock or a partnership interest that represents a continuing interest in the
asset(s) contributed to the corporation or partnership; and (iii) Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2
provides a mechanism for a taxpayer to furnish cash to a QI to fund the acquisition of
designated replacement property where the QI does not have sufficient cash from the sale of
the relinquished property to otherwise do so.
2.
Should the Form of the Transaction be Respected? Are there other facts
present that are inconsistent with the purported transfer to QI?3 The primary factual/legal
questions that must be examined are (a) under the controlling loan documents, may the
taxpayer transfer title to QI, and (b) has title for tax purposes already shifted from the taxpayer
to the lender? It seems advisable to examine the loan documentation to ascertain whether the
transfer to QI may be void as a matter of law and also whether the transfer causes the
nonrecourse loan to become immediately due and payable. If these circumstances exist, the
Service may argue that there has been no transfer. One can imagine the Service making a
similar argument if the loan is already in default. Ultimately, however, it appears that the
taxpayer’s position may hinge on the second question, to wit: who is the owner of the
underwater asset as of the date of the purported transfer to QI – the taxpayer or the lender? It
seems clear that one of the parties must be treated as the owner for tax purposes, and this
raises the question of what events must have occurred in order for a nonrecourse lender with
respect to an underwater asset to become the owner of such asset for federal income tax
purposes (i.e., has there been a constructive foreclosure). As noted above, the mere diminution
in the value of an asset (even if below the debt) does not constitute a realization event as to the
current owner. The question, therefore, should turn on whether other events have occurred that
would support a conclusion that tax ownership of the asset should be viewed as having moved
to the lender prior to the conveyance of the asset to QI.
Based upon the foregoing, it seems advisable that, if a like-kind exchange involving an
underwater asset is to be pursued, the controlling loan documents must be carefully reviewed
and the totality of the facts related to the communications, understandings and dealings
between the taxpayer and the lender must be fully probed and understood. Even with “good”
facts, extreme caution is suggested due to the nature of the issue and the absence of any direct
authority addressing these transactions.

2

Rosen v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 11 (1974), aff’d, 515 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1975) (the taxpayer realized gain under section
357(c) to the extent the liabilities assumed exceeded the adjusted basis of the assets transferred).
3
An interesting, and unresolved, question is whether the taxpayer can enter into a deed-in-lieu agreement with the lender
and seek to assign such deed-in-lieu contract to QI in an attempt to satisfy the formalistic requirements of the QI
regulations.
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ABANDONMENT AND WORTHLESSNESS OF PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS:
A DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE
1.
Overview. In recent years, taxpayers have devoted a substantial amount of time
determining alternative courses of action available to them with respect to their interests in
troubled partnerships. In some cases, an individual may own an interest in a partnership whose
assets (or sole asset) is subject to debt substantially in excess of the FMV of such asset(s). In
other cases, a partnership may own multiple assets, one or more of which may be owned by a
lower tier partnership in which the taxpayer-partnership (the upper-tier partnership) owns an
interest. In these instances, the taxpayer that owns the interest in the troubled partnership
increasingly is evaluating whether he should abandon his partnership interest and claim a loss
with respect to such interest, while in other cases partners are evaluating whether such interests
have become worthless for purposes of IRC section 165(a).
It is impossible to address all possible scenarios in this outline. Taxpayers owning
interests in troubled partnerships, however, generally will fall into one of two categories. Certain
taxpayers will have a loss inherent in their partnership interest (i.e., their adjusted tax basis in
their partnership interest will exceed their share of partnership debt) whereas others will have a
gain inherent in their partnership interest (i.e., their adjusted tax basis in their partnership
interests will be less than their share of partnership debt). In the former case, the taxpayer has a
positive tax capital account while in the latter case the taxpayer’s tax capital account will have a
negative balance. It is important to keep in mind that if the partner does nothing, he or she may
end up recognizing both ordinary COD Income and a capital loss, which loss may not be carried
back and can only be used in the future if the taxpayer thereafter recognizes capital gains.
Needless to say, taxpayers who find themselves in this situation, having suffered a real
economic loss and then owing tax on COD Income (and possibly at higher rates beginning in
2011), will not be happy campers (or happy, continuing clients). The balance of this section of
the outline will focus on the circumstances under which a partner with a tax loss inherent in its
partnership interest may claim a deduction with respect to its partnership interest under IRC
section 165(a), will analyze the differences between abandonment and worthlessness
deductions and will then synthesize the intersection of analysis between foreclosure events and
claims of abandonment and worthlessness.1
The discussion that follows focuses primarily on the ability of a partner to claim a loss on
the ground that its interest in a partnership is worthless as well as the character of any such
loss. In recent years, there has been an increased focus on whether partnership interests
should be abandoned, particularly where a partner determines that, on a net tax basis, it is to
the partner’s advantage to walk away from its partnership interest, particularly where the partner
would recognize COD Income (and possibly an offsetting or corresponding capital loss) if the
partner does not abandon its interest and the partnership eventually loses its assets pursuant to
a foreclosure (or similar event). It is for this reason that partners increasingly are “running the
numbers” to ascertain whether they should stay the course or take proactive steps to minimize
the tax burden they will ultimately suffer when the underwater asset is completely submerged
and lost.
2.
IRC section 165(a). IRC section 165(a) provides that a taxpayer may claim as a
deduction “any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or
otherwise.” Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) provides that, in order to claim a loss under IRC section
1

Sowell, supra.
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165(a), the loss must be (1) evidenced by a closed and completed transaction, (2) fixed by
identifiable events, and (3) actually sustained during the year for which the deduction is claimed.
As explained more fully below, the loss will be an ordinary loss so long as there is neither an
actual nor a deemed distribution of cash (pursuant to IRC section 752(b)) to the taxpayer and so
long as the transaction is not otherwise in substance a sale or an exchange.
The following discussion concentrates on several key court decisions that focus on the
circumstances under which a partner may claim a worthlessness deduction with respect to its
partnership interest under IRC section 165(a) as well as the stance that the Service has taken
with respect to the availability and character of deductions claimed under IRC section 165(a)
with respect to abandoned or worthless partnership interests. It appears that the Service does
not fully appreciate the difference between abandonment and worthlessness (or that the Service
believes that the facts that must be present to sustain a deduction are the same for both
concepts). As noted below, the Service’s position on the question of worthlessness of
partnership interests has not been sustained by the courts that have considered this issue.
3.
Echols and Tejon Ranch. In 1993, the Service issued Rev. Rul. 93-802
seemingly in response to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Echols v. Commissioner3 (seemingly
because the Service in Rev. Rul. 93-80 did not mention Echols or the Fifth Circuit’s analysis
therein). The following discussion will analyze Echols and other authorities (particularly Tejon
Ranch Co. v. Commissioner4 the reasoning of which was heavily relied upon by the Fifth Circuit
in Echols), together with several other court decisions that discuss the abandonment and
worthlessness of partnership interests, and will provide commentary regarding this emerging
and confusing area of the tax law affecting troubled partnerships and partners who own
interests therein.
The taxpayers in Echols owned an interest in a limited partnership that owned land.
Following a series of unfortunate events, including the default of a developer who owned a
portion of the land, the taxpayers called a partners’ meeting during May 1976 and announced
they would no longer contribute to the partnership their 75 percent share of the funds needed to
make mortgage and ad valorem tax payments owing with respect to the land, the FMV of which
was then less than the principal balance of the outstanding nonrecourse loan secured thereby.
The partnership had unsuccessfully attempted to restructure the loan and had ceased its
attempts to sell the land. In February 1977, the lender foreclosed on, and acquired title to, the
land. At the May 1976 meeting, the taxpayers offered to convey their partnership interest to the
other partner or to anyone else who wished to assume their obligations. The other partner also
averred he would not furnish any further funds to the partnership. The partnership also ceased
making ad valorem tax payments and mortgage payments during 1976.
The taxpayers claimed a deduction with respect to their partnership interest under IRC
section 165(a) on the ground they had abandoned such interest. Alternatively, the taxpayers
claimed a deduction on the ground the partnership interest was worthless. While Echols is
frequently cited with respect to the Fifth Circuit’s reversal of the Tax Court’s decision that the
taxpayers had not abandoned their partnership interest in 1976,5 by far the more interesting
2

1993-2 C.B. 239.
935 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Echols I”), rehearing denied, 950 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Echols II”).
4
49 T.C.M. 1357 (1985).
5
The law is settled that a partner who abandons his interest in a partnership may deduct his loss related thereto under
IRC section 165(a). See Rev. Rul. 93-80, supra; 1997 FSA Lexis 190 (July 7, 1997); Citron v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 200
(1991).
3
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aspect of Echols is the Fifth Circuit’s excruciatingly detailed discussion of the circumstances
under which a partner may claim a loss for worthlessness under IRC section 165(a).
a.
Echols I. In Echols I, the Fifth Circuit began its opinion by noting that two
important distinctions must be kept in mind at all times: (1) the case at hand involved the
partners, not the partnership, and (2) the abandonment and worthlessness of a partnership
interest are distinct concepts and that “either concept can, under proper circumstances,” give
rise to a deduction under IRC section 165(a). The Fifth Circuit then noted that both the Tax
Court (93 T.C. 553 (1989)) and the Service failed to remain cognizant of these distinctions and
such failures led to an incorrect decision by the Tax Court. As we shall see, this is another
instance where the proper characterization of a transaction or fact pattern is critical in
determining the tax consequences to be accorded thereto.
In holding that the taxpayers were also entitled to a deduction in 1976 on the basis that
their partnership interest was worthless during that year, the court noted that while the test for
abandonment is objective, the test for worthlessness is both subjective and objective. The
subjective part of the test, according to the court, seems to require nothing more than the
taxpayer himself deem his asset to be worthless. The taxpayer’s subjective desire and opinion,
however, are not enough to sustain the deduction (or satisfy the requirements of IRC
section 165(a) and Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b)). Rather, as more fully articulated in the Fifth
Circuit’s second opinion (Echols II, discussed below) when it denied the Service’s motion for
rehearing, the taxpayer-partner must still show “closed and completed transactions … fixed by
identifiable events” in the year for which the loss is claimed. The Fifth Circuit went to great
lengths to make clear its view that such identifiable events need not be property level events
such as the sale or other disposition of the property or the abandonment of the partnership
interest itself. This is a critical point because it appears that the Service believes that aggregate
principles of partnership taxation are to be applied in the worthlessness context6 while the Fifth
Circuit treated the partnership as an entity and felt that the partners’ interest in the partnership
should be looked at on a standalone basis in making the worthlessness determination.
The Fifth Circuit then considered whether the taxpayers had abandoned their
partnership interest and noted that although the Tax Court, the Service and the taxpayers
unanimously agreed that a taxpayer need not relinquish title to a partnership interest to
establish an abandonment loss, the Tax Court nevertheless analyzed the abandonment
question by reference to previous cases where there had been an actual disposition of property
by the partnership rather than an abandonment by the partner of its partnership interest. The
Fifth Circuit concluded that the taxpayers had in fact abandoned their partnership interest in
1976 by virtue of their affirmative actions that evidenced that they were walking away from their
ownership interest (a combination of their declarations and their overt acts).
The Fifth Circuit next addressed the taxpayers’ alternative argument supporting their
claimed loss under IRC section 165(a) – that their partnership interest had become worthless in
1976. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the facts, as found by the Tax Court, supported a
worthlessness deduction, noting that while the test for finding abandonment was a purely
objective test, worthlessness requires both objective and subjective testing. The subjective test
requires a finding that the taxpayer subjectively believes his partnership interest in worthless
and then the taxpayer must objectively prove that the interest was in fact valueless at such
time. In Echols I, the Fifth Circuit found that the taxpayers manifest their subjective
6

See 1997 FSA Lexis 190, supra.
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determination by (1) claiming the loss deduction in 1976 and (2) having made it clear during
such year that they would no longer fund the expenses or debt service owing by the partnership.
The court further observed that there is not a specific date on which a partnership interest
becomes worthless but rather each partner may reach its own conclusions regarding the
worthlessness of its particular interest. The court also stated that the taxpayer need not show
that the FMV of its partnership interest “fell to or below zero” during the year in question, nor
must the taxpayer show that its interest is “absolutely, positively without any value whatsoever.”
As noted below in the detailed discussion of Rev. Rul. 93-80, the Service does not share this
view.
In rendering its opinion and conclusions regarding worthlessness, the Fifth Circuit relied
heavily on the Tax Court’s opinion in Tejon Ranch, where the partnership in question had
become “insolvent beyond any hope of rehabilitation” and such insolvency constituted the
“closed and completed event” that warranted the worthlessness deduction.
b.
Tejon Ranch. The facts of Tejon Ranch were as follows: A public
corporation (through its subsidiary acting as a general partner) contributed land to a newlyformed limited partnership for the purpose of developing such land for agricultural purposes.
The partnership raised cash from the public and, together with debt financing, commenced the
agricultural business. Subsequently, the partnership suffered severe economic distress and
defaulted on loans owing by it to both third party lenders and its general partner. The senior
lender considered foreclosing on its lien but opted not to because it feared the partnership
would file for bankruptcy and such filing would result in further costs and losses to the lender.
Instead, the lender advanced additional operating funds to preserve its collateral, took over the
partnership’s operations and sought to restructure the partnership’s debt. The third party loans
were in fact restructured and the senior lender agreed to fund the partnership’s operations for
one additional month.
The Tax Court considered whether the taxpayer was entitled to a loss deduction (1)
under IRC section 166 for certain loans (“Partner Loans”) made by it to the partnership, and (2)
under IRC section 165 for capital contributions made by it to the partnership. With respect to the
deduction claimed with respect to the partnership interest, the court noted that, to be deductible
under IRC section 165(a), the “loss must be evidenced by closed and completed transactions,
fixed by identifiable events, which show the year in which such a loss was sustained.”
The taxpayer argued that its loans and partnership interest became worthless during
1977. The Tax Court concluded that, although the partnership was in financial difficulty by the
end of 1977, the loans had not yet become worthless. In so holding, the court noted that the
partnership had not defaulted on its loans (there were two other senior loans made to the
partnership by unrelated lenders) and there was “some possibility that [the partnership] could
secure additional financing” to cover its working capital needs. In addition, the partnership was
selling off assets to raise cash and, in the court’s view, there had not been an identifiable event
to “justify abandonment of any hope of recovery.”
The court held that the loans became worthless in 1978 when the partnership ran out of
operating funds and the primary unrelated lender (1) was considering foreclosing on the
partnership’s assets (which foreclosure was not pursued because the lender was concerned
about the costs associated therewith) and (2) took over operating control of the partnership and
restructured the partnership’s debt. The foregoing occurrences were ruled to be identifiable
events that demonstrated the worthlessness of the Partner Loans. The court emphasized that
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the lender was effectively in control of the partnership at such time, but the court did not hold or
consider whether the assets of the partnership should be deemed owned by the lender at such
time.
With regard to the taxpayer’s interest in the partnership, the Service argued that a
deduction under IRC section 165 was not available because no closed or completed transaction
had occurred (such as a dissolution or liquidation). The court dismissed the Service’s argument
and ruled that the taxpayer was entitled to claim a worthlessness deduction in respect of its
partnership interest in 1978 because the partnership was “insolvent beyond any hope of
rehabilitation by the end of 1978.”
In so holding, the court noted that, although an interest in a partnership is a capital
asset, a loss resulting from the worthlessness of the interest is not a capital loss since there has
not been a sale or exchange of the interest.7 While not explicitly addressed by the court, it
appears that the taxpayer had a share of partnership liability under section 752 by virtue of the
fact that it was a general partner.
c.
Echols II. Following the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Echols I, the Service
petitioned for rehearing and asked the court to withdraw its alternative holding that the
taxpayers were entitled to claim a worthlessness deduction under IRC section 165(a) with
respect to their partnership interest. The Service claimed that the court’s “treatment of
worthlessness ‘threatens substantial and lasting damage to the law governing loss under
§ 165(a)’.”
In rejecting the Service’s motion, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Service’s argument, “if
accepted, would totally subsume ‘worthlessness’ in ‘abandonment.’” The court stated that a
taxpayer may claim a loss deduction under IRC section 165(a) for both (i) non-worthless assets
that have been abandoned, and (ii) worthless assets that have not been abandoned, noting
again that the two concepts are separate and distinct from one another, and not simply two
sides of the same coin.
The court also observed that the Service only cited abandonment cases to support its
position on worthlessness and that the Service failed to cite any support for its argument that a
taxpayer must divest itself of title to the property in question to sustain a worthlessness
deduction. Rather, in the view of the Fifth Circuit, a taxpayer is entitled to a deduction under IRC
section 165(a), in the absence of an abandonment, so long as there has been either any closed
and completed transaction or any identifiable event supporting worthlessness. The court cited
Rhodes v. Commissioner8 for the proposition that “abandonment is not the exclusive way to
establish worthlessness.”
The court also cited Proesel v. Commissioner,9 where the Tax Court addressed the
types of “closed and completed transactions” and “identifiable events” needed to demonstrate
worthlessness and noted that these transactions and events include not only sales and
abandonments, but also “other acts or events” indicating worthlessness. The Fifth Circuit then
noted that the analysis should focus on “objective events confirming the taxpayer’s subjective
determination” that the asset is worthless.
7

The Tax Court cited IRC sections 1222 and 741 and also referred to Gannon v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 1134 (1951).
100 F.2d 966 (6th Cir. 1939).
9
77 T.C. 992 (1981).
8
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The Fifth Circuit next observed that the Service had misinterpreted its alternative holding
in Echols I in arguing that such alternative holding abolished the need for the taxpayer to meet
the identifiable event standard for the year in which the loss is claimed. Rather, the court
reiterated that worthlessness requires (i) a subjective determination by the taxpayer that the
asset was worthless during the year in question, and (ii) the presence of objective factors
reflecting a completed transaction and/or an identifiable event during such year, and that
such transactions and events are not limited to the transfer of title or an abandonment. The Fifth
Circuit also supported its position by noting that the Service’s position was specifically rejected
in Helvering v. Gordon,10 Tejon Ranch, supra, and Rev. Rul. 54-581.11 In Echols, the default by
the third party developer and the inability to restructure the debt were viewed as closed and
completed events that evidenced the worthlessness of the taxpayers’ partnership interest.
The final point addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Echols II was whether the court’s holding
in Echols I would permit taxpayers to select the year of deduction because of the subjective
prong of the test. The court summarily dismissed this argument by noting that while a subjective
determination does belong to a taxpayer, to sustain the deduction the taxpayer must also
objectively show that identifiable events or closed transactions had occurred.
d.
Proesel. In Proesel v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayers owned an
interest in an upper tier partnership that owned an interest in a lower tier partnership, which
lower tier partnership produced a motion picture for a third party. The lower tier partnership
incurred debt and pledged its rights under the production agreement to the lender. The
taxpayers claimed that the motion picture became worthless in 1972 (as a result of the inability
of the parties to find a distributor for the film). The Service argued that, at the earliest, the film
became worthless in 1977 when the lender foreclosed on its security interest.
In considering whether the taxpayers were entitled to a deduction under IRC section
165(a), the Tax Court focused first on the amount that might be allowed as a deduction if the
lower tier partnership’s right to be paid for the production of the film was worthless.12 The court
held that, under IRC section 165(b), the amount of a deduction under IRC section 165(a) is
equal to the taxpayer’s adjusted tax basis in the property in question. The court then analyzed
the taxpayers’ interest in the partnership (presumably using entity principles) and that their basis
in the upper tier partnership interest included their share of the liabilities of the upper and lower
tier partnerships. The Service argued that the taxpayers’ share of the partnership liabilities
should not be taken into account unless and until the taxpayers in fact satisfied or paid such
liabilities. The Tax Court rejected the Service’s argument, noting that the taxpayers did have
personal liability for their share of the debt and that they might be called upon to pay such share
in the future.
The Tax Court next considered whether the lower tier partnership’s right to be paid for
the production of the film became worthless in 1972. The court observed that while a mere
decline in the value of the asset is not sufficient to establish a worthlessness loss with respect to
an asset, the taxpayer “need not be an incorrigible optimist” in determining when the asset
becomes worthless. In holding that the taxpayers were not entitled to a loss deduction in 1972,
10

134 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1943).
1954-2 C.B. 112.
12
It should be noted that the taxpayer appeared to use aggregate principles to sustain its deduction and did not argue that
its interest in the upper tier partnership was worthless.
11
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the court emphasized that the commercial exploitation of the film was still viable and, in its view,
the film had suffered merely a diminution in value during 1972 and did not become worthless
until 1977 when the lender foreclosed on its security interest.
4.
The Empire Strikes Back – Revenue Ruling 93-80. In Rev. Rul. 93-80, the
Service set forth its views with regard to the abandonment or worthlessness of a partnership
interest, presumably in an attempt to close the books once and for all regarding when such a
deduction can be claimed and the character of any such loss. In the ruling, the Service posited
two situations, each of which addressed an abandonment of a partnership interest and neither
of which mentioned whether the interests in the two partnerships were worthless. Rather, the
facts recited in each situation merely stated that the partnerships in question were insolvent and
that a partner in each partnership took all steps necessary to effect a proper abandonment of
his partnership interest, including the delivery of written notice to the partnership. In one case,
liabilities of the partnership had been allocated to the abandoning partner while in the other case
none of the partnership’s liabilities had been allocated to the abandoning partner.
The Service stated in Rev. Rul. 93-80 that, to establish the abandonment of an asset,
the taxpayer must demonstrate an intent to abandon the asset and must overtly act to abandon
same. Without mentioning Echols or Tejon Ranch (or the courts’ analyses therein), the Service
also stated that an asset is worthless when it in fact has no value.13 Rev. Rul. 93-80 further
stated that: “whether a loss from the abandonment or worthlessness of a partnership interest is
capital or ordinary depends on whether or not the loss results from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset,” and “a loss from the abandonment or worthlessness of a partnership interest will
be ordinary if there is neither an actual nor a deemed distribution to the partner under the
principles [of IRC § 752(b)] described above.” “The Transaction” [emphasis added] also cannot
otherwise be “in substance a sale or exchange.”
It is interesting to note that the conclusions drawn in Rev. Rul. 93-80 addressed both
abandonment and worthlessness while the two fact patterns only involved abandonment. As
pointed out by the Fifth Circuit in Echols, it appears that the Service continues to confuse the
distinction between abandonment and worthlessness by referring to “a transaction.” In the case
of a worthlessness claim, of course, there is no transaction in the sense intended by the Service
(sale or exchange transaction); rather, the partner is merely claiming that his asset (the
partnership interest) has become worthless, which as noted by the courts in Tejon Ranch and
Echols does not require a sale or exchange by the partner of its partnership interest or a sale or
exchange by the partnership of its assets. Rather, the proper test for determining if a
partnership interest has become worthless is whether an event has occurred that confirms that
the partnership interest is in fact worthless, which can include the hopeless insolvency of the
partnership in question and the irretrievable failure of the parties to restructure the debt of the
partnership.
Subsequent to the issuance of Rev. Rul. 93-80, the Service issued a Field Service
Advice,14 wherein the Service expressed its disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
Echols regarding worthlessness and stated that worthlessness losses are arguably capital
losses since the Fifth Circuit did not “distinguish the character of the loss based on
worthlessness from the capital loss based on abandonment.” As noted by Sowell, supra, the
13

The Service cited two cases to support this conclusion: Laport v. Commissioner, 671 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1982); Boehm
v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945).
14
1997 FSA-Lexis 190 (July 7, 1997).
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taxpayers in Echols had in fact abandoned their partnership interest and, thus, their loss was a
capital loss since they no longer owned an interest in the partnership. As also noted by Sowell,
all of the cases allowing a deduction based solely on the worthlessness of a partnership interest
have allowed an ordinary deduction to be claimed.
5.
Basis Consequences of Worthlessness Deduction. In the event that a
partner claims a worthlessness deduction with respect to his partnership interest, it appears that
such partner must reduce his outside basis with respect to such partnership interest by the
amount of the deduction. It would appear that the partner’s share of the partnership’s liabilities
(as determined under IRC section 752) would not be reduced or otherwise affected by the
deduction nor would the partner’s IRC section 704(b) capital account be reduced or otherwise
impacted. In addition, because the deduction does not require a reduction in the partnership’s
basis in its assets (under IRC section 734 or 743), it appears that the deduction can result in an
inside-outside basis difference vis-à-vis the partner(s) claiming the deduction.
6.
Interplay between IRC sections 165 and 172: Is the worthlessness
deduction a “business loss?” In the event that an individual taxpayer claims an ordinary loss
in respect of a worthless partnership interest under IRC section 165(a), the taxpayer must also
ascertain whether such loss is a “business” loss pursuant to IRC section 172. If the loss is not a
business loss under such section, the taxpayer will not be entitled to carry the loss back or
forward as a net operating loss under IRC section 172 nor may the taxpayer carry the loss
forward as a capital loss. In other words, in the case of a worthlessness loss that it is not a
“business” loss, the loss will be of benefit to the taxpayer only if it can be used in the year the
loss is claimed.
7.
Summary regarding worthlessness deductions. The critical question for a
taxpayer who is considering whether his partnership interest is worthless is whether an
identifiable event has occurred that supports the worthlessness claim, and what “objective” facts
or actions have occurred or need to occur or exist to support such claim? Is the mere insolvency
of the partnership sufficient? Or that the partnership has defaulted on its loan obligations or
does not have the wherewithal to pay its operating expenses? Or that the taxpayer-partner (as
in Echols) made clear his intention not to fund any additional operating needs of the business?
With regard to the last point, does it matter if the taxpayer-partner has never previously funded
any such deficits?
Based upon the Fifth Circuit’s analysis and statements in Echols, it seems prudent for
taxpayers seeking to claim worthlessness deductions with respect to their partnership interests
to identify the objective facts that exist at the time to support their claimed deductions and not to
rely solely upon the fact that the partnership’s liabilities exceed the value of its assets.
8.
Final Comments – The Intersection of the Doctrines of Constructive
Foreclosure, Abandonment and Worthlessness. The intersection of (1) the doctrine of
constructive foreclosure/abandonment (a partnership level event where the owner of an
underwater asset ceases to be considered the owner of such asset for tax purposes, with the
asset being deemed sold or transferred to the creditor for an amount equal to the debt owing to
such creditor), (2) the doctrine of abandonment (a partner level event where a partner in a
troubled partnership affirmatively walks away from his interest in such partnership and is entitled
to deduct the loss inherent in his partnership interest without actually selling such interest) and
(3) the doctrine of worthlessness (where a partner in a troubled partnership continues as a full
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partner in the troubled partnership but nevertheless claims a loss deduction on the ground his
partnership interest is worthless) requires a careful consideration of the facts presented in each
particular case because the applicability of or decision to utilize each doctrine is inextricably
linked to and emanates from the distress that exists at the partnership/property level. As a
result, being aware of the different tax consequences that result from foreclosure transactions
(gain, loss and/or COD Income recognition at the partnership level) or abandonment or
worthlessness deductions (claimed at the partner level) can allow partners and their tax
advisors to determine the most tax efficient course of action (or inaction) to pursue.
a.
Actual or Constructive Foreclosure. The challenges posed by the
intersection of these three doctrines can be best illustrated by an example that frequently arises.
In this example, one or more real estate assets are owned by an LLC that is treated as a
partnership for federal income tax purposes, the asset(s) are encumbered by debt and the debt
is characterized as recourse debt for purposes of IRC section 1001. If the LLC defaults on the
loan and the creditor forecloses on or otherwise acquires the asset, it is likely that the LLC will
recognize COD Income, such income will be allocated by the LLC to its members, and the
members will be taxed thereon at ordinary income tax rates unless a member can utilize one of
the exclusions provided for in IRC section 108(a) (typically the insolvency exclusion, which
exclusion requires a detailed analysis of the assets and liabilities of the member), or, if the COD
event occurs during 2009 or 2010, the member elects to defer the recognition of the COD
Income under IRC section 108(i).15 If the LLC owns a capital asset then, in addition to
recognizing COD Income on the foreclosure event, the LLC may also recognize a capital loss
that would be allocated to its members, and such members may not offset their shares of the
COD Income with their shares of the capital loss. On the other hand, if the LLC owns an asset
described in IRC section 1231 (a “1231 Asset”), then the possibility of a character mismatch is
less problematic because any loss realized by the LLC on the foreclosure transaction or other
disposition presumably would constitute a loss governed by IRC section 1231 which effectively
could be used to offset any COD Income allocated to and recognized by the taxpayer who owns
an interest in the LLC.16
It is important to note that, in the foregoing example, the COD Income arises because
the debt is a recourse liability as to the LLC for purposes of IRC section 1001 even if the liability
is a nonrecourse liability for purposes of IRC sections 704(b) and 752. If the owners of the LLC
(or if the debtor is a general or limited partnership, the partners therein) have personal liability
with respect to the underwater debt, such owners will remain liable to the creditor for their
respective shares of any deficiency that is owing to the creditor following the foreclosure.
On the other hand, if the LLC debt is nonrecourse for purposes of IRC section 1001, a
foreclosure or other disposition event should not result in COD Income; rather, the asset(s)
securing the debt would simply be viewed as sold for an amount equal to the nonrecourse debt
and the LLC would have gain or loss on such sale equal to the difference between the amount
of the debt and the LLC’s tax basis in the asset(s).
In recent years, taxpayers have had to decide whether they should simply wait for the
inevitable (foreclosure and loss of the asset), or whether they should take proactive steps before
the foreclosure event occurs. In these instances, the taxpayer first must assess the resulting tax
15

See Appendix IV for a summary of IRC section 108(i).
Ordinary losses claimed under IRC section 1231 may be recaptured as ordinary income under IRC section 1231(c) if
the taxpayer recognizes IRC section 1231 gain during the ensuing five-year period.
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consequences if he does nothing. If the debt is nonrecourse for purposes of IRC section 1001, it
may be in the taxpayer’s best interest to simply wait the situation out and hope for the best –
that the property recovers and is no longer underwater. In the meantime, the taxpayer will defer
recognizing any built-in gain inherent in his partnership interest (the so-called negative basis
(debt over basis) that will be triggered when the eventual foreclosure occurs). If the taxpayer
elects this route, his primary risk is that the Service may take the position that the partnership
should be deemed to have constructively abandoned its property. As noted elsewhere in this
outline, a mere decline in the value of the property (even a substantial decline in value) is not
enough by itself to cause the property to be deemed constructively foreclosed upon or
abandoned. The factors that may bear upon whether a property should be deemed
constructively foreclosed upon or abandoned include (among others) whether (1) the lender and
the debtor have effectively agreed upon the lender’s taking over control and management of the
property (without a formal transfer to the creditor of title to the property or the interests in the
LLC), (2) the modification of the debt with the lender acquiring various control and “ownership”
type rights, or (3) other events indicating that the creditor has acquired de facto ownership of the
property.
If the LLC’s debt is recourse for purposes of IRC section 1001, delaying the inevitable
foreclosure may be beneficial for both tax and economic purposes. If the LLC’s members do not
have any personal liability for the debt, deferring the transfer of tax ownership will defer the
recognition by the LLC of both COD Income and gain or loss on the foreclosure provided that
the Service does not successfully invoke the doctrine of constructive foreclosure. In this case, of
course, the LLC’s members eventually could recognize both COD Income and a capital loss. If
the FMV of the asset(s) increase while the tax recognition is deferred, then the amount of COD
Income that would be recognized will decline. Deferral of the taxable event at the LLC level will
also be economically beneficial when the LLC’s members have assumed or undertaken
personal liability for the LLC’s debt to the extent the FMV of the asset(s) increases and the
resulting deficiency that would be owing by such members correspondingly decreases. This all
assumes, of course, that values increase. If values decline, the opposite would be true and the
LLC members could suffer both economically and on a net tax basis.
b.
Abandonment. In situations where the taxpayer believes that he will
never recoup his investment in the LLC and/or that a foreclosure is imminent (presumably in the
next year or two) and that such foreclosure could result in the taxpayer recognizing both COD
Income and a capital loss upon the liquidation of the LLC (to the extent the taxpayer has basis
in his LLC interest as a consequence of the allocation of the COD Income to him), taxpayers
increasingly are considering abandoning their LLC (partnership) interests in advance of the
foreclosure event. If the LLC or partnership interest is effectively abandoned, the taxpayer will
recognize gain or loss depending on whether such taxpayer has a negative tax capital account
in respect of its LLC or partnership interest at the time of the abandonment. Any such gain may
be capital gain or ordinary income depending on the nature of the LLC’s assets, while any loss
will be ordinary or capital under IRC section 165(a) depending on whether the taxpayer has
been allocated liabilities of the LLC or partnership under IRC section 752 prior to the
abandonment.
c.
Worthlessness. As noted above, if a taxpayer has a tax loss inherent in
his LLC or partnership interest (typically reflected by the taxpayer having a positive tax capital
account with respect to his partnership interest), a foreclosure event can result in both ordinary
income and capital loss to the taxpayer, and an abandonment can result in a capital loss if the
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taxpayer previously has been allocated debt under IRC section 752. In this setting, the taxpayer
should consider whether his LLC or partnership interest is in fact worthless and if so, whether
the taxpayer is entitled to claim a worthlessness deduction under IRC section 165(a). If the
taxpayer can establish that the LLC or partnership interest is worthless (satisfying the subjective
and objective tests as articulated in Echols), it appears that such loss may be treated as an
ordinary loss under Tejon Ranch and Echols. It should be kept in mind, however, that the
Service has never conceded that the loss is an ordinary loss when the taxpayer previously has
been allocated debt of the LLC or partnership under IRC section 752, and in fact took the
contrary view in Rev. Rul. 93-80 and 1997 FSA Lexis 190, supra. Another reason that a
taxpayer may wish to affirmatively claim a worthlessness deduction is that by doing so, the
taxpayer would preclude the Service from later taking the position that the taxpayer, by failing to
claim the loss under IRC section 165(a) in the earlier year (of worthlessness) lost its opportunity
to claim a deduction for its economic loss (often referred to as the “use it or lose it” dilemma).
While the authors are not aware of any instances where the Service has argued that a
taxpayer’s partnership interest was worthless in a year that preceded the year in which the
taxpayer eventually claimed a deduction for his economic loss, this possibility increasingly has
become a concern for partners and their tax advisors. For this reason, a taxpayer with an
interest in a troubled partnership should closely scrutinize his facts, analyze such facts in light of
the applicable authorities, and tread very cautiously.
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PARTNERSHIP WORKOUTS – SELECT TAX ISSUES
In most cases, real estate is held through a flow-through entity. In some cases, the entity
may be an SMLLC while in other cases the real estate may be owned by a joint venture, LLC,
general partnership or limited partnership that is treated as a partnership for federal income tax
purposes and is subject to the various rules contained in Subchapter K of the Code. While it is
beyond the scope of this outline to address all of the difficult questions that can arise in the
context of a partnership workout transaction (and there are many), we instead will focus on
some of the more vexing problems that can arise.1
1.
Allocation of COD Income Among the Partners. The question regarding how
a partnership should allocate its COD Income among its partners is not addressed by IRC
section 108 or the legislative history of IRC section 108 contained in the Bankruptcy Tax Act of
1980 (“BTA 1980”). In addition, neither IRC section 704(b) nor the regulations promulgated
thereunder provide any guidance or discussion as to how such income should be allocated by a
partnership among its partners. It appears that Congress assumed that the amount of COD
Income allocated to a partner would be exactly equal to the portion of the debt discharged which
theretofore had been allocated to him under IRC section 752.2 Under this assumption, the
partner's adjusted basis in his partnership interest would be increased by the COD Income
allocated to him (IRC section 705(a)(1)) and then reduced (in an equal amount) by virtue of the
decrease in the partnership's liabilities occasioned by the debt discharge (IRC sections 752(b)
and 733(l)). As a result, the partner's adjusted basis would remain unchanged and the partner
would not recognize any additional amounts of income or gain under IRC section 731.3
a.
General Partnerships. In the case of a typical general partnership
where the general partners bear all items of partnership income, gain, loss and deductions on
the same proportionate basis, COD Income recognized by the partnership will typically be
allocated to the partners in accordance with their respective partnership percentages. The
decrease in the partnership's liabilities resulting from the debt discharge would likewise be
shared by the partners in accordance with their partnership percentages. As a result, the debt
modification or exchange would not result in income to any partner in excess of any COD
Income allocated to him by the partnership.
b.
Limited Partnerships and LLCs. In the case of a limited partnership or
LLC (or a general partnership in which the partners do not share all items on the same
proportionate basis), the determination of how the partnership's COD Income should be
allocated among the partners will depend upon a variety of factors, the most significant of which
are the nature of the debt (recourse or nonrecourse) and the extent to which a particular partner
is personally liable for the repayment of the debt.
1

For a more thorough analysis of some of the partnership tax issues that can arise in a working setting, see Frankel, “Tax
Planning for Troubled Real Estate and Partnership Transactions – Parts 1 and 2,” 19 and 20 J. Real Est. Tax. 267, 6
(Summer and Fall 1992); Frankel and Coffin, “Partnership Workouts: Problems and Solutions Under Final Section 704(b)
and 752 Regulations,” 9 J. Partnership Tax. 287 (Winter 1993); Frankel and Coffin, “New Section 752 Regulations Clarify
Treatment of Partnership Liabilities,” 6 J. Partnership Tax. 179 (Fall 1989); Frankel and Coffin, “Treatment of Allocations
Attributable to Loans Under New 704(b) Regulations,” 6 J. Partnership Tax. 294 (Winter 1990).
2
See S. Rep. No. 96-1035, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980) (reprinted at 1980-2 C.B. 620-647) [hereinafter “1980 S.Rep.”], at
14, 16, 20, n. 24.
3
This analysis assumes that the deemed distribution is not taken into account under IRC section 731(a) at the time of
the debt discharge, but rather is taken into account at the end of the year. See Rev. Rul. 92-97, 1992-2 C.B. 124;
Rev. Rul. 94-4, 1994-1 C.B. 196.
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(1)
Nonrecourse Debt. If the debt discharged is a nonrecourse
liability, it appears that the COD Income resulting from the discharge may be allocated to the
partners in the same ratios in which the nonrecourse debt is allocated to them under IRC
section 752. If the COD Income is allocated in this manner, the Congressional assumption that
the partner's adjusted basis will be unaffected will be fulfilled and the only income recognized by
the partner will be the COD Income so allocated to him. Allocating the COD Income in this
manner should be respected under IRC section 704(b).
(2)
Recourse Debt. If the debt discharged is a recourse liability, the
COD Income should be allocated first to the partners who have negative tax capital accounts
(such negative balances being attributable to prior deductions associated with the debt in
question). If there is further COD Income to allocate among the partners, the partners must
decide whether the COD Income should be allocated in accordance with their profit-sharing
percentages or in accordance with the manner in which they bore the economic risk of loss for
the remaining discharged debt immediately prior to the discharge. If the COD Income is
allocated in accordance with the partners' profit-sharing percentages, the partners who did not
bear any economic risk of loss for the discharged debt (the “Non-Liable Partners”) will be
allocated COD Income with respect to a debt for which another partner bore the economic risk
of loss. While such an allocation might not prove to be burdensome to a Non-Liable Partner who
is insolvent (and thus can exclude such COD Income under IRC section 108(a)(1)(B)) or has
NOLs or passive activity losses that can be used to offset such COD Income, the Non-Liable
Partner who is both solvent and profitable will not be so lucky, and will be forced to recognize
and pay tax on what could be a significant amount of phantom income (although such partners
ultimately should be allocated the tax deductions attributable to basis generated by the
nonrecourse indebtedness). In addition, an allocation of COD Income to the partners in
accordance with their profit-sharing ratios will also result in a deemed distribution to the partners
who bore the economic risk of loss for the discharged debt (“Liable Partners”) under IRC
sections 731/752 in an amount greater than such partners' shares of the COD Income, which
could result in such partners recognizing additional gain under IRC section 731(a).4 For this
reason, many tax advisors believe that the COD Income should be allocated entirely to the
Liable Partner(s) in the same proportions that the discharged debt was allocated to them under
IRC section 752 immediately prior to the discharge.5 If the COD Income is allocated in this
manner, the Non-Liable Partners will not be allocated any phantom income and the Liable
Partners' adjusted bases in their partnership interests will remain unchanged. If this second
alternative is employed, however, the allocation of COD Income solely to the Liable Partners
may alter the parties’ economic arrangement. The potential for such an alteration will exist
because the Liable Partners' capital accounts have not been reduced prior to the debt discharge
transaction to reflect the presumed decline in the FMV of the partnership's assets. In such a
case, it may be advisable for the partnership agreement to be amended to provide that the loss
inherent in the partnership's assets will, when recognized, be allocated solely to the Liable
Partner to whom the COD Income was allocated.6 By taking this step, the partners would ensure
that the decline in value which the Liable Partner agreed to bear is effectively allocated to his
4
But see Rev. Rul. 71-301, 1971-2 C.B. 256 (insolvency exception applied to partner who recognized gain pursuant
to IRC section 731(a) in connection with debt discharge transaction). Although it is not clear, it is possible that this
ruling has vitality following BTA 1980, particularly since Congress did not envision COD Income being allocated to
partners in a ratio varying from the ratio in which the discharged debt was previously allocated to them under IRC
section 752.
5
This position may have been given some support by the holding in Great Plains Gasification Associates, supra.
6
Such an amendment would have the same effect as a book-down under Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f). It is not
clear that any such adjustments may be made under IRC section 704(b) or Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b).
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capital account, which allocation would offset the amount of COD Income previously allocated to
him.
(3)
Special Allocations of COD Income. In some cases, the
partners may attempt to specially allocate the partnership's COD Income to a partner who is
insolvent and thus able to exclude such COD Income from his gross income under IRC section
108(a)(1)(B). While such an allocation may be crafted to satisfy the economic effect prong of
IRC section 704(b) and the regulations promulgated thereunder, it appears that such allocation
may not be “substantial,” in which event the Service may ignore such allocation and reallocate
the COD Income in accordance with the partners' interests in the partnership.7
2.
Partnership Restructurings – Admission of the New Equity Partners and
Contributions of Debt to Equity. Instead of modifying or restructuring the partnership's debt,
the partnership may itself be restructured, with a new partner (or the lender itself) being
admitted to the partnership. In certain cases, the new partner will be a third party who
contributes cash that is used to pay down part of the existing loan balance or commits to
contribute or loan cash to the partnership, as needed, to enable the partnership to satisfy its
debt service obligations or other operating expenses. In other cases, the lender will be admitted
to the partnership in exchange for its contribution to the partnership of part or all of the debt
owing to it by the partnership. The following discussion assumes that the existing debt of the
partnership is nonrecourse debt.8
3.
Third Party as New Partner. If a third party is willing to carry the troubled
property by agreeing to contribute cash to the partnership to fund the partnership's operating
deficits or to pay down the existing partnership debt, the transaction can be structured in one of
two ways: either the third party can be admitted to the partnership and become a partner
directly therein or the third party and the partnership (the “old partnership”) can form a new
partnership (“subpartnership”) with the third party contributing cash and the old partnership
contributing its property to the subpartnership. These alternatives can have drastically different
results for the parties.
a.
Direct Admission. If the third party is admitted directly into the old
partnership, the partnership agreement will be amended and the old partners' percentage
interests in the partnership's income and loss will be reduced.
7

See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii); Rev. Rul. 99-43, 1999-2 C.B. 506; FSA 2001-31-013 (May 1, 2001). It should
be noted that neither IRC section 108, IRC section 704(b) nor the legislative history of such sections prohibits special
allocations of COD Income. See McKee, Nelson & Whitmire, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS,
Chapter 24, at ¶ 9.02[2][a][ii], n. 160. The IRS addressed allocations of COD Income among partners in Rev. Rul. 9297, 1992-2 C.B. 124. The gist of this ruling is that an allocation of COD Income will not be respected if, following the
allocation, any partner has a negative capital account which he has no liability to restore upon the liquidation of the
partnership and is not otherwise matched by a share of minimum gain.
8
The following discussion is a summary of the types of questions that must be focused upon whenever a partnership
is being restructured. Similar questions will arise if the partners' interests in the partnership are being adjusted
pursuant to a squeezedown procedure contained in the partnership agreement or otherwise agreed to by the
partners. The discussion that follows only focuses on two of a myriad of possible restructuring transactions and is
designed merely to remind the reader of the need to examine the impact that these transactions may have on
partners under IRC sections 704(b), 731 and 752. The discussion is not exhaustive, however, and other Code
provisions also must be considered, including IRC section 465(e) (relating to at risk recapture). For a more complete
analysis of the impact of IRC sections 704(b) and 752 and the regulations promulgated thereunder on partnership
workouts, and also for a discussion of other workout scenarios and issues, see Frankel and Coffin, “Partnership
Workouts: Problems and Solutions Under Final Section 704(b) and 752 Regulations,” 9 J. Partnership Tax. 287
(Winter 1993).
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(1)
Book Adjustments Made. In connection with such admission,
the parties must determine whether the old partners' capital accounts and the book values of
the partnership's assets are to be adjusted (i.e., booked-up or booked-down) under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f). While it is likely that these adjustments would not be intended to generate
any income or gain to the old partners, such adjustments may, in fact, result in the old partners
recognizing income or gain, as illustrated below.
(a)
Impact on Minimum Gain Shares and Minimum Gain
Chargeback. If the partnership has minimum gain immediately prior to the admission of the
third party to the partnership, the partnership's debt remains constant, and the partnership's
assets are revalued, the adjusted book bases of the assets will be at least equal to the
outstanding balance of the nonrecourse debt, thereby reducing the partnership's minimum gain
to zero. At the same time, the old partners' capital accounts would be increased (presumably to
zero) if the value of the partnership property is equal to the nonrecourse debt. As a result, the
minimum gain chargeback would be avoided. This result has been explicitly provided for in, and
is based upon a literal reading of, Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-2(d)(4) and 1.704-2(g)(2).
(b)
Impact on Shares of Basis. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.7523(a), the admission of the new partner and the adjustment of the book bases of the
partnership's assets will result in a shift of a portion of the partnership's nonrecourse debt from
the old partners to the new partner. The amount so shifted will depend upon several factors, the
most significant of which are the profit percentage of the new partner and the partnership's book
basis in its assets immediately prior to the admission. In general, the amount of liabilities that
will be shifted to the new partner will be equal to the new partner's profit percentage multiplied
by the old book basis.9 Although this shift will result in a deemed distribution of cash to the old
partners under IRC sections 752(b) and 733(1), the amount deemed distributed should never
exceed the basis of an old partner in his partnership interest. Consequently, the deemed
distribution should not result in gain to any old partner under IRC section 731(a)(1).10 It should
also be observed that over time, as the partnership claims depreciation deductions with respect
to its booked-up assets, the partnership will experience increases in its IRC section 704(b)
minimum gain (which will be shared by the partners in accordance with the new profit
percentages), and decreases in its IRC section 704(c) minimum gain. This will effectively result
in a further shift in liabilities from the old partners to the new partner, with the old partners
experiencing deemed distributions under IRC sections 752(b) and 733(1) as these shifts occur.
Under these circumstances, the old partners eventually will receive deemed distributions in
excess of their bases, and thus will be forced to recognize income under IRC section
731(a)(1).11

9

The balance of the debt, which already produced deductions or distributions enjoyed by the old partners, initially will
be allocated solely to the old partners as their IRC section 704(c) minimum gain amounts.
10
This assumes that the partnership debt remains unchanged following the admission of the new partner to the
partnership. If the new partner contributes cash to the partnership which is used to repay part or all of the
partnership's debt, the old partners may be deemed to receive taxable distributions under IRC section 731(a)(1). In
this event, if the partnership has an IRC section 754 election in effect, the partnership will be entitled to increase its
basis in its property under IRC section 734(b), subject, however, to IRC section 755 and the regulations promulgated
thereunder. In this event, the old partners generally should be permitted to correspondingly increase their capital
accounts under Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(m)(4).
11
See Rev. Rul. 84-102, 1984-2 C.B. 119 (deemed distribution under IRC section 752 to historic partners upon admission
of new partner may trigger income to historic partners under IRC section 751.)
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(2)
Book Adjustments Not Made. If the partners elect not to revalue
the partnership's assets in connection with the admission of the third party as a new partner,
and the partnership's debt is not reduced, the partnership will retain its historic amount of
minimum gain (and the old partners their shares thereof). In addition, because the old partners
will retain their historic shares of IRC section 704(b) minimum gain, the old partners will retain
sufficient shares of partnership debt to avoid gain recognition under IRC section 731(a)(1).12 In
addition, because IRC section 704(c) minimum gain amounts are not created, there will not be a
shift of basis over time from the old partners to the new partners, as is the case where the
partnership's assets are revalued. Thus, not making the revaluation election can produce
several meaningful benefits to the old partners. However, the failure to book-up will mean that
the principles of IRC section 704(c) will not be applicable to the partnership and, consequently,
the amount of taxable income (or loss) allocated to the new partner may be greater (less) than
the amount of taxable income (loss) that would have been allocated to such partner had the
partnership's assets been revalued and the principles of IRC section 704(c) became applicable.
4.
Use of Subpartnership. In some cases, the third party may insist that he be
admitted to a subpartnership, with the old partnership contributing its assets to such
subpartnership. This desire may be prompted by the third party's desire to avoid undisclosed or
unknown liabilities of the old partnership. If this technique is used, a threshold question that
must be answered is whether the transaction is governed by IRC section 721.13 If the
contribution is governed by IRC section 721, any book-tax disparity must be accounted for
under the rules of IRC section 704(c), with the subpartnership's initial book basis in the
contributed property being equal to its FMV14 and the old partnership's initial capital account in
the subpartnership being equal to zero.15 If IRC section 721 applies, then pursuant to IRC
section 752(c), the subpartnership will be deemed to acquire the property subject to only that
portion of the nonrecourse debt that does not exceed the FMV of the property. Although not
entirely clear, it appears that the remainder of the debt (i.e., the portion in excess of the
property's FMV) should be deemed to remain outside the subpartnership. If this analysis is
correct, this excess portion would remain a liability of the old partnership that arguably continues
to burden its interest in the subpartnership.16 As a result, the old partnership's historic minimum
12

So long as a partner's IRC section 704(b) minimum gain amount under Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3(a)(1) is equal to the
deficit balance in his capital account, deemed distributions of cash to such partner under IRC section 752(b) will
never result in any taxable gain to such partner under IRC section 731(a)(1).
13
See Like Kind Exchange on the Eve of Foreclosure, supra, footnote 1 and the accompanying text.
14
See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d)(1).
15
See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b)(2), -1(b)(2)(iv)(d)(1) (IRC section 7701(g) does not apply in determining the
FMV of contributed property). See generally McKee, Nelson & Whitmire, supra, at ¶ 7.04[3]; Burke, “Partnership
Formation Under the Temporary Section 752 Regulations: A Reply and Further Discussion,” 69 Taxes 116, 125
(Feb. 1991); Lokken, “Contributions of Overencumbered Property: A Reply and Further Discussion,” 5 J. Partnership
Tax. 242, 243 (Fall 1988); but see Carman & Brown, “Another Look at Accounting for Contributions of
Overencumbered Property: Turning Basis Inside Out,” 7 J. Partnership Tax. 192, 193-94 (Summer 1990)
(contributing partner's initial capital account should be equal to FMV of contributed property less the total amount of
nonrecourse debt secured thereby).
16
See Burke, supra note 219, at 125; Stafford, “Section 752(c): The Other Issue in Tufts v. Commissioner,” 42 Tax
Law. 93 (Fall 1988). It has been suggested that while IRC section 752(c) may limit the amount of liabilities deemed
taken subject to by the subpartnership, the old partnership nevertheless should be deemed relieved of the entire
liability for purposes of determining its basis in its interest in the subpartnership. See Burke, supra, at 125; Andrews,
“On Beyond Tufts,” 61 Taxes 949, 958-59 (Dec. 1983). The latter theory seems incongruous, however, because it
would effectively result in the excess portion of the debt vanishing both inside and outside the partnership (i.e., such
amount would not be considered a liability of either the old partnership or the subpartnership). Such a conclusion
would thus ignore the fact that the liability does exist and that it burdens the property. The better view, therefore, is
that by virtue of IRC section 752(c), the excess portion of the debt should be deemed to be a continuing liability of the
old partnership that is “secured” by its interest in the subpartnership.
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gain initially would be preserved because its share of the subpartnership's debt under IRC
section 752 plus the excess portion of the debt deemed returned by it would exceed its basis in
its interest in the subpartnership by an amount equal to its historic minimum gain amount.17
Similarly, because the regulations issued under IRC section 752 were drafted to ensure that the
old partnership's share of the subpartnership's liabilities for purposes of IRC section 752 would
not be less than the old partnership's minimum gain (immediately prior to the contribution), the
amount of any deemed distribution from the subpartnership to the old partnership pursuant to
IRC sections 752(b) and 733(1) should be less than the old partnership's basis in its
subpartnership interest and, thus, the old partnership should not recognize any gain under IRC
section 731(a)(1). However, as the old partnership's share of the subpartnership's debt is shifted
over time to the new partner, the old partnership (and thus its partners) will be required to
recognize income as the amount of cash deemed distributed to it exceeds its basis in its
subpartnership interest. A yet unanswered question is the extent to which the regulations issued
under IRC section 707(a)(2)(B) may change the results described above. It appears that these
regulations should be totally inapplicable to the subpartnership so long as the debt secured by
the contributed property was incurred more than two years ago or was incurred to purchase the
property. The result seems less clear, however, if the subpartnership simultaneously pays down
part of the debt with cash contributed by the new partner.
5.
Contributions and Distributions of Overencumbered Property. As
referenced in the preceding paragraph, IRC section 752(c) provides that, for purposes of IRC
section 752, a liability to which property is subject shall, to the extent of the FMV of such
property, be considered a liability of the owner. The consequences of this rule for purposes of
IRC section 752 and beyond are not entirely clear.18 It would appear, at least for purposes of
IRC section 752, that in the context of the contribution of overencumbered property, the
partnership would be treated as having assumed the liability only to the extent of the FMV of the
contributed property, while the contributing partner would be considered to remain the debt
holder with respect to the excess debt after the contribution. Similarly, in the case of a
distribution of overencumbered property from a partnership, this rule would appear to limit the
decrease in the partnership’s liabilities to the FMV of the distributed property, with the
partnership remaining the debtor for the balance of the liability.
6.
Admitting the Nonrecourse Lender to the Partnership. If the lender (or a
related person) is admitted to the partnership, the following tax issues should be carefully
considered. The remainder of this section of the outline assumes that the lender is admitted to
the partnership in exchange for the debt owing to it by the partnership or, alternatively, to satisfy
the lender's demand that it receive a portion of any profits the partnership may realize in the
future. 19
17

The excess of the FMV of the contributed property over the adjusted basis of such property will constitute the old
partnership's IRC section 704(c) minimum gain amount which, if the subpartnership were to immediately sell the
contributed property for the nonrecourse debt secured by such property, would be specially allocated to the old
partnership under IRC section 704(c). If the actual FMV of the contributed property is less than the nonrecourse debt
and, as posited above, the excess debt is deemed to burden the old partnership's interest in the subpartnership, the
excess amount presumably would be taken into account in determining the old partnership's minimum gain. If the
excess debt is not taken into account in this manner, it appears that the old partnership's minimum gain would be
deemed to decrease, which could trigger a minimum gain chargeback at the old partnership level.
18
See, Miller and Bowers, “Section 752(c): A Riddle Wrapped In A Mystery Inside an Enigma,” PLI Tax Planning for
Domestic & Foreign Partnerships, for a discussion of the issues associated with the contribution, distribution,
foreclosure and other topics related to overencumbered property.
19
See Appendix III, regarding the consequences of the exchange of debt for an interest in a partnership under IRC
section 108(e)(8).
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a.
Recharacterization of the Debt as Partner Nonrecourse. If the lender
is admitted to the partnership and the loan is not contributed to the partnership in exchange for
the partnership interest, the loan will cease to be a nonrecourse loan unless the lender does not
acquire more than a ten percent interest in any item of income or loss of the partnership.20 The
loan will instead be characterized as a partner nonrecourse loan.
b.
Impact on Shares of Liabilities. If the debt is contributed to the
partnership and thereby canceled, the old partners' shares of the partnership's liabilities will be
reduced, thereby triggering deemed distributions under IRC sections 752 and 733(l). Similarly, if
the debt remains outstanding but is converted into a partner nonrecourse loan, the old partners
will receive deemed distributions of cash under such sections. If the partners recognize income
under IRC section 731(a)(1) and the partnership has an IRC section 754 election in effect for
such year, however, the partners' capital accounts may be increased pursuant to Treas. Reg.
§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(m)(4).
c.

Minimum Gain Chargeback.

(1)
Debt Exchanged for Partnership Interest. If the lender
contributes the debt to the partnership in exchange for a partnership interest, the debt will
disappear and the partnership's minimum gain with respect to such liability will be reduced to
zero. In such event, the minimum gain chargeback rules will apply and the old partners must be
allocated items of income to eliminate that portion of the deficits in their capital accounts that
were attributable to the nonrecourse loan.
(2)
Debt Remains Outstanding. Even if the debt is not contributed
to the partnership, because the loan will be transformed into a partner nonrecourse loan, the
partnership's minimum gain will be reduced to zero, thereby triggering a minimum gain
chargeback.
d.
Impact on Future Deductions. If the loan remains outstanding, in whole
or in part, any deduction thereafter claimed by the partnership in respect of the loan will
constitute partner nonrecourse deductions, which must be allocated entirely to the lender.21

20
21

Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(d).
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-2(i).
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APPENDIX I
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY AUTHORITIES
FROM THE GOLDEN AGE OF WORKOUTS
Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures
Discharge of Nonrecourse Debt. Rev. Rul. 91-31, 1991-1 C.B. 19: Discharge of
nonrecourse debt results in COD Income regardless of whether the FMV of the property
securing such loan exceeds or is less than the outstanding debt prior to the discharge.
Insolvency Measurement – Excess Nonrecourse Debt. Rev. Rul. 92-53, 1992-2 C.B.
48: For purposes of measuring a taxpayer’s insolvency under IRC section 108(d)(3), the
amount by which a nonrecourse debt exceeds the FMV of the property securing such debt is
taken into account only to the extent the excess nonrecourse debt is discharged.
Treatment of COD Income as Passive Income. Rev. Rul. 92-92, 1992-2 C.B. 103:
COD Income constitutes passive income under IRC section 469 to the extent that, at the time of
the debt cancellation, the debt is allocated to passive activity expenditures.
Purchase Price Adjustments Under IRC Section 108(e)(5). Rev. Proc. 92-92, 1992-2
C.B. 505: The Service will not challenge a bankrupt or insolvent partnership’s treatment of a
reduction of such partnership’s debt as a purchase price adjustment under Service section
108(e)(5) provided the transaction would otherwise qualify as a purchase price adjustment
under IRC section 108(e)(5) but for the bankruptcy or insolvency of the partnership.
Partnership COD Income – Treatment as Draw. Rev. Rul. 92-97, 1992-2 C.B. 124:
Constructive distributions under IRC section 752(b) resulting from a cancellation of debt is
treated as occurring on the last day of the partnership taxable year under the “drawing rule”
found in Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a)(1)(ii).
Allocation of COD Income – Substantial Economic Effect. Rev. Rul. 92-97, 1992-2
C.B. 124: An allocation of COD Income to a partner that differs from the partner’s share of the
cancelled debt under IRC section 752(b) has substantial economic effect under IRC section
704(b) even where, as a result of the deemed distribution, a partner’s capital account is reduced
below zero, if (1) such partner has an obligation to restore such deficit capital account balance
to satisfy other partners’ positive capital account balances, (2) the requirements of the economic
effect test are otherwise met, and (3) substantiality is independently established.
Partnership COD Income – Timing of Draw. Rev. Rul. 94-4, 1994-1 C.B. 196: A
deemed distribution of money under IRC section 752(b) resulting from a decrease in a partner’s
share of the liabilities of a partnership in connection with the cancellation of debt of such
partnership is treated as an advance or drawing of money under Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a)(1)(ii)
to the extent of the partner’s distributive share of the partnership’s income for the taxable year in
question; such advance or draw is taken into account at the end of the taxable year and not at
the time of the debt cancellation event.
Allocation of COD Income – Book Adjustments and Substantiality. Rev. Rul. 9943, 1999-2 C.B. 506: Special allocation of COD Income solely to an insolvent partner lacked
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substantiality under Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii) where increase in insolvent partner’s capital
account by virtue of the COD Income allocation was effectively offset by book loss allocated
pursuant to a contemporaneous revaluation of the partnership’s assets; following the COD
Income and book loss allocations, the partners’ capital accounts continued to be in the same
ratio to one another as existed prior to the cancellation event.
Legislative and Regulatory Changes
Qualified Real Property Business Indebtedness. As a result of substantial
discussions between the Service, various industry groups and tax professionals, IRC sections
108(a)(1)(D) and 108(c) were added to the Code in 1993 to allow individual taxpayers (and S
corporations) to exclude COD Income where the taxpayer is not insolvent or in bankruptcy if the
debt in question was incurred in connection with the acquisition of real property used in a trade
or business and is secured by such real property. This exclusion, for “qualified real property
business indebtedness,” may be elected only if the taxpayer reduces, on a dollar-for-dollar
basis, the taxpayer’s adjusted tax basis in depreciable real property owned by such taxpayer
(including the taxpayer’s share of basis in depreciable real property owned by partnerships in
which he is a partner). See Appendix II for a summary of these provisions (and related
regulations issued under IRC section 1017).
Partnership Debt for Equity Exchanges. IRC section 108(e)(8) modified to explicitly
provide that a partnership that issues an interest in such partnership to its creditor is treated as
having satisfied the debt with an amount of money equal to the value of the partnership interest
issued to the creditor, with the partnership realizing COD Income to the extent the FMV of the
partnership interest is less than the amount of debt exchanged therefor. Prior to this legislative
change, some advisors took the position that the partnership debt for equity exchange did not
result in COD Income to the debtor partnership on the theory that the transaction was governed
by either (i) the common law debt for equity exception and/or (ii) IRC section 721. In 2008, the
Service proposed regulations to address the application of IRC section 108(e)(8) to partnerships
(see Prop. Reg. § 1.108-8(b)(1); Prop. Reg. § 1.721-1(d)(1)). See Appendix III for a summary of
these regulations.

Appendix I

2

APPENDIX II
QUALIFIED REAL PROPERTY BUSINESS INDEBTEDNESS REGULATIONS
ISSUED UNDER IRC SECTIONS 108 AND 1017
On October 22, 1998, regulations were finalized regarding the application of the basis
reduction rules in IRC sections 108 and 1017. These regulations are effective for debt
discharges occurring on or after October 22, 1998. In addition to providing the classification and
order in which the debtor's basis in property is to be reduced for COD Income excluded under
IRC section 108, the regulations provide rules regarding the treatment of a partnership interest
as depreciable property under IRC section 1017(b)(3)(C). The regulations also provide guidance
on applying the limitations on basis reduction found in IRC sections 108 and 1017. On
December 15, 1999, final regulations were issued that, among other things, provide guidance
relating to the computation of a partner’s proportionate share of the adjusted basis of
depreciable property (or depreciable real property) under IRC section 1017. These regulations
apply to elections made under IRC sections 108(b)(5) and 108(c) on or after December 15,
1999.
1.
Making IRC section 108(b)(5) and 1017(b)(3)(E) Elections. Under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.108-4, a bankrupt or insolvent debtor can elect on Form 982 (Reduction of Tax Attributes
Due to Discharge of Indebtedness (and IRC section 1082 Basis Adjustment)) to reduce the
basis of depreciable property under IRC section 108(b)(5). Similarly, under Treas. Reg. §
1.1017-1(f), a debtor can elect on Form 982 to treat real property held for sale as depreciable
property. The Form 982 must be attached to the debtor's timely filed (including extensions)
Federal income tax return for the tax year in which the debtor realized the COD Income that is
excluded under IRC section 108(a). The election only may be revoked with the consent of the
Service. These regulations replaced a similar rule in Temp. Reg. § 301.9100-13T. The
temporary regulation permitted the debtor to make the election with an amended return or claim
for refund if the debtor established reasonable cause for failing to file the election with the
original return. The final regulations do not contain this reasonable cause exception.
2.
IRC section 108(c) Limitations on COD Income Exclusion. Treas. Reg. §
1.108-6 provides rules regarding the two limitations, found in IRC section 108(c)(2), on the
amount of discharged QRPBI that can be excluded under IRC section 108(a)(1)(D). The
regulations make some additions to the statutory requirements that are not provided for in the
legislative history.
a.
Debt Over FMV Limitation. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-6(a) provides that the
amount of the excluded debt cannot exceed the excess of the outstanding principal amount of
the discharged debt immediately before the discharge over the net FMV of the qualifying real
property immediately before the discharge. The timing of this determination is consistent with
the legislative history. The regulations go beyond the legislative history and the statute,
however, by providing that the net FMV is calculated by reducing the FMV of the property
(disregarding IRC section 7701(g)) by the outstanding principal amount of any other QRPBI
secured by qualifying real property immediately before and after the discharge.1

1

IRC section 7701(g) generally provides that, for purposes of determining gain or loss, the FMV of the sold property is
treated as being not less than the amount of nonrecourse debt to which the property is subject.
Appendix II

1

b.
Depreciable Real Property Basis Limitation. The second statutory
limitation provides that the amount of discharged QRPBI that can be excluded cannot exceed
the adjusted basis of depreciable real property of the debtor immediately before the discharge
(other than depreciable real property acquired in contemplation of the discharge) after the basis
reductions made to the property under IRC section 108(b) or 108(g) (regarding qualified farm
indebtedness). Treas. Reg. § 1.108-6(b) provides that the determination of this limitation is
made after the basis of the depreciable real property is reduced by the depreciation claimed for
the year.
3.
Order of IRC section 108(b)(2)(E) Basis Reduction. For title 11 and insolvent
debtors, the regulations generally retain the tracing approach to basis reduction and the
ordering rules found in previously applicable regulations under IRC sections 1016 and 1017.
The regulations, however, eliminate the requirement that basis first be reduced in property
purchased with the discharged debt. The regulations also do not carry over the FMV limitations
found in the IRC section 1016 regulations applicable to bankrupt debtors.
a.
Order of Reduction. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(a), a title 11 or
insolvent debtor will reduce the basis of its property in the following order:


real property, used in a trade or business or held for investment and not held for sale, that
secured the discharged indebtedness immediately before the discharge;



personal property, used in a trade or business or held for investment, other than inventory,
accounts receivable and notes receivable, that secured the discharged indebtedness
immediately before the discharge;



remaining property used in a trade or business or held for investment (other than inventory,
accounts receivable, and notes receivable and real property held for sale);



inventory, accounts receivable, and notes receivable, and real property held for sale; and



property not used in a trade or business nor held for investment.

The basis reduction in each class of property is to be made in proportion to the relative amounts
of adjusted basis within the class.
b.
Debtor's Partnership Interests. A debtor's interest in a partnership may
be considered real or personal property secured by the discharged debt to the extent of the
partner's distributive share of partnership COD Income. This rule is discussed in more detail
below.
c.
Operating Rules. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(b) provides three operating
rules to be applied to IRC section 108(b)(2)(E) basis reductions.
(1)
First, the regulations provide that the amount of basis to be
reduced under IRC section 108(b)(2)(E) equals the amount of the excluded COD Income less
the prior reduction of other tax attributes required under IRC section 108(b)(2) or elected under
IRC section 108(b)(5).
(2)
Second, a special rule is provided in the case of multiple
discharged debts to determine what portion of each discharged debt remains to be applied
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against the basis in the debtor's property after the non-basis tax attributes have been reduced.
The determination is made by allocating the non-basis tax attribute reductions among the
discharged debts in proportion to the amount of COD Income attributable to each discharged
debt. The unapplied portion of each discharged debt then will be applied to reduce basis in
accordance with the ordering rules.
(3)
The third rule incorporates and clarifies the IRC section 1017(b)(2)
limitation on basis reduction. Under the regulation, the IRC section 108(b)(2)(E) basis reduction
cannot exceed the excess of the aggregate bases of the property and the amount of money of
the debtor immediately after the discharge over its aggregate post-discharge liabilities. IRC
section 1017(b)(2) does not specifically refer to the debtor's money in its calculation of the
limitation. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(c)(3), the IRC section 1017(b)(2) calculation is made
after reducing the debtor's basis in property under IRC section 108(b)(5).
The regulations formerly applicable under IRC sections 1016 and 1017 allowed a debtor
to request from the Service that the basis reductions be applied only to certain of its properties.
A debtor could make this request to avoid making small reductions in basis in many of its
properties. The current regulations do not provide for such a ruling request.
d.
Modification of Ordering Rules for Basis Reductions Under IRC
sections 108(b)(5) and 108(c). Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(c) modifies the IRC section
108(b)(2)(E) basis reduction ordering rules for debtors electing to first reduce the tax basis in
depreciable property under IRC section 108(b)(5), or electing to treat the discharged debt as
QRPBI under IRC section 108(c). Under these modifications, a debtor electing under IRC
section 108(b)(5) can reduce only the basis of depreciable property, and a debtor electing under
IRC section 108(c) can reduce only the basis of depreciable real property. The regulations also
modify the general ordering rule by requiring that the basis reduction under IRC section 108(c)
first be applied against the basis of the real property securing the discharged QRPBI and then
against the basis of the debtor's other real property.
A debtor electing under IRC section 108(b)(5) to first reduce basis in depreciable
property may elect under IRC section 1017(b)(3)(E) to treat real property held for sale as
depreciable property. The general ordering rule of the regulations includes real property held for
sale in the class of property with inventory and notes and accounts receivable. Presumably, real
property held for sale that did not secure the discharged debt and for which an IRC section
1017(b)(3)(E) election was made will be included in the inventory and receivables class under
the basis ordering rules applicable to IRC section 108(b)(5) as well.
e.
Anti-Abuse Rule. Like many recent regulations, the regulations contain
an anti-abuse rule. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(d), if any property is added or eliminated as
security for indebtedness, such addition or elimination during the one-year period preceding the
discharge of the indebtedness will be disregarded if a principal purpose of the change is to
affect the basis reductions under IRC section 1017. This rule would prevent debtors from
manipulating the requirement that basis first be reduced in the property securing the discharged
debt by either securing or releasing the lien on a particular property in contemplation of the
discharge.
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f.

Treatment of Partnership Interests as Depreciable Property.

Treatment of Allocated Share of Partnership COD Income. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017(g)(1)
requires a partner to treat its distributive share of partnership COD Income as attributable to
discharged debt secured by the partner's interest in the partnership. Treas. Reg. § 1.10171(g)(2) provides that if a partner makes an election under IRC section 108(b)(5) (or 108(c)), the
partner must treat the partnership interest as depreciable property (or depreciable real property)
to the extent of the partner’s proportionate share of the partnership’s basis in depreciable
property (or depreciable real property), provided the partnership consents to a corresponding
reduction in the partnership’s inside basis in depreciable property (or depreciable real property)
with respect to such partner. The partner must request that the partnership reduce the partner’s
share of basis in depreciable partnership property if basis reductions are being made to the
partner’s depreciable property with respect to its distributive share of partnership COD Income.
The partnership, however, is not required to consent to the partner's request unless the
requesting partners in the aggregate own more than 80 percent of the capital and profits
interests in the partnership or if five or fewer partners owning (directly or indirectly) in the
aggregate more than 50 percent of the interests in capital and profits of the partnership so
request.2
The regulations do not specify how to allocate the reduction in the partner's share of
partnership property basis among the partnership's properties, other than to refer to the other
rules in the IRC section 1017 regulations. It is possible that the partnership would ignore the
characterization of the debt at the partner level as secured by the partnership interest, and
would reduce basis under the ordering rules applicable to the discharged debt that generated
the COD Income.
g.
Partner Electing Under IRC section 108(b)(5) or 108(c). IRC section
1017(b)(3)(C) provides that a partnership interest “shall be treated as depreciable property” to
the extent of the partner's share of the depreciable property held by the partnership, provided
the partnership makes a corresponding reduction in the partnership's basis in depreciable
property with respect to that partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(g)(2)(i) follows the statutory rule by
providing that a partner that elects to reduce basis under IRC section 108(b)(5) or 108(c) must
treat a partnership interest as depreciable property or depreciable real property, to the extent of
the partner's proportionate share of the partnership's basis in depreciable property or
depreciable real property, if the partnership consents to a corresponding reduction in the
partnership's basis in depreciable property or depreciable real property with respect to that
partner. If the partnership does not grant consent, the partnership interest may not be treated as
depreciable property or depreciable real property.
(1)
When Consent Must be Requested. An electing debtor is
required to request consent of the partnership to reduce the debtor's share of partnership basis
only if he owns (directly or indirectly) more than 50 percent of the capital and profits interests of
the partnership, or if basis reductions are being made in the partner's depreciable property with
respect to its distributive share of partnership COD Income. If a partner is a greater than 50

2

The preamble to the regulations clarify that a partnership’s consent to reduce the basis of the partnership’s depreciable
property is neither required nor relevant where a partner reduces the basis in its partnership interest under IRC section
108(b)(2)(E).
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percent partner in many partnerships, he would be required to request consent from each
partnership.
(2)
Purpose of Consent Requirement. The purpose of requiring the
consent request by a more than 50 percent partner is to prevent the partnership from being
used as a vehicle to avoid the general ordering rules. Without this requirement, a debtor could
avoid reducing the basis in the property that secured the excluded COD Income under the
general ordering rules by transferring the property prior to the debt discharge to a controlled
partnership that would not consent to reduce the property's basis. Treasury did not want to allow
taxpayers to obtain a different tax result through the use of a controlled partnership than would
be achieved had they owned the partnership property directly.
(3)
When Consent Must be Granted. The regulations require the
partnership to consent to reduce its partners' shares of depreciable basis of partnership
property if consent is requested by partners owning, directly or indirectly, in the aggregate more
than 80 percent of the capital and profits interests in the partnership or by five or fewer partners
owning, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the interests in capital and profits of the
partnership. The regulations do not provide a standard by which indirect ownership would be
determined nor do they specify at what point in time the percentage interests in the partnership
are measured. This partnership consent requirement may be inconsistent with the IRC section
1017 legislative history, which appears to make the partnership's consent elective.3
(4)
Partnership Basis Reduction. Regulations issued in 1999
provide guidance with respect to determinations of a partner’s proportionate share of the
partnership’s basis in depreciable property and the treatment of the partner’s basis adjustment
in its share of depreciable partnership property.4 A partner’s proportionate share of the
partnership’s depreciable property is equal to the sum of (i) the partner’s IRC section 743(b)
basis adjustments to items of partnership depreciable property and (ii) the common basis
depreciation deductions (excluding remedial allocations of depreciation deductions) that are
reasonably expected to be allocated to the partner over the property’s remaining useful life
under the terms of the partnership agreement effective for the year in which the discharge
occurs. For this purpose, the partnership may not treat the same depreciation deductions as
being reasonably expected by more than one partner.
The amount of the basis reduction to depreciable partnership property is an adjustment
to such property with respect to the partner only. No adjustment is made to the common basis of
partnership property. Recovery of the adjustment is made in the same manner as provided in
Treas. Reg. § 1.743-1 and the adjustment is treated in the same manner and have the same
effect as an adjustment to the basis of partnership property under IRC section 743(b). The
properties in which the partnership will reduce basis are determined under the ordering rules of
Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1 described above.5

3

S. Rep. No. 1035, 96th Cong, 2d Sess. 22, 1980-2 C.B. 620, 631 (1980) (partnership interest treated as depreciable real
property “if the partnership agrees to make a corresponding reduction in the basis of the partnership property with respect
to such partner”). Compare H.R. Rep. No. 111, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 624 (1993), 1993-3 C.B. 167, 200 (partnership
basis in depreciable property with respect to partner electing under IRC section 108(c) “is correspondingly reduced”).
4
Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(g)(2)(iv) and (v).
5
Treas. Reg. § 1.1017-1(g)(3).
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(5)
Mechanics of Partner Request and Partnership Consent. A
partner's request to the partnership must be made prior to the due date (including extensions)
for the filing of the partner's Federal income tax return for the year in which the partner has
excluded COD Income under IRC section 108(a). The consent of the partnership must be
included with its Form 1065 for the year of the partnership following the year that ends with or
within the tax year the taxpayer excludes the COD Income. The partnership must provide the
requesting partner with a statement of consent on or before the due date of the partner’s tax
return (including extensions) for the tax year in which the partner excludes the COD Income.
The statement must contain the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the
partnership and state the amount of the reduction in the partner's share of the partnership's
basis in its depreciable property or depreciable real property. The partner, in turn, is required to
attach the consent statement to its timely filed (including extensions) Federal income tax return
for the year the COD Income is excluded. The partnership's consent statement need only show
the aggregate reduction in the partner's share of partnership basis. This aggregate rule is not
clearly stated in the regulations, but is apparent from a statement in the preamble to the
proposed regulations that a property-by-property basis disclosure requirement was considered
but rejected as too burdensome.
(6)
Timing Concerns. The preamble to the regulations recognize
that a partner might not have sufficient information with which to decide to request a basis
reduction until on, or shortly before, the due date (including extensions) for filing the partner’s
return. The Service decided not to require partnerships to inform their partners of COD Income
prior to the date the Form 1065 is filed. Rather, it was determined that additional administrative
burdens imposed on partnerships should be the result of an understanding between the
partners and the partnership.6
(7)
Tiered Partnerships. The regulations do not address how the
partnership interest as depreciable property rule is to be applied to tiered partnerships. While
the legislative history to BTA 1980 specifically provides that the subsidiary stock as depreciable
property rule can be applied successively through chains of corporations so long as the lowest
tier subsidiary reduces its basis in depreciable property,7 it made no mention of tiered
partnerships.
In a series of private letter rulings, the “partnership interest as depreciable property” rule
has been applied to two-tier partnerships. In each of these private rulings, the upper tier
partnerships' interests in the lower tier partnership were treated as depreciable property to the
extent of the upper tier partnerships' interests in the depreciable property held by the lower tier
partnership, provided a corresponding basis reduction was made in the lower tier partnership's
basis in depreciable property with respect to the upper tier partnerships. The partners' interests
in the upper tier partnerships, in turn, was treated as depreciable property to the extent of their
proportionate interest in the depreciable property held by the upper tier partnerships, provided a

6

The Service also determined the Treas. Reg. § 1.703-1(a)(1) required the partnership to separately state QRPBI and
identify it as such and, therefore, rejected the comment that partnerships should be required to attach a statement to the
K1 stating that the COD Income is from QRPBI and the date of the discharge.
7
S. Rep. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980), 1980-2 C.B. 620, 627.
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corresponding basis reduction was made in the upper tier partnerships' basis in depreciable
property with respect to the upper tier partners.8

8

See, e.g., PLR 9426006 (March 25, 1994). Also issued the same day were: PLRs 9426007-9426019 (March 25, 1994).
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APPENDIX III
PARTNERSHIP DEBT FOR EQUITY EXCHANGES –
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED REGULATIONS UNDER IRC SECTIONS 108 AND 721
Congress extended IRC section 108(e)(8) to debtor partnerships in the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 with respect to cancellations of indebtedness occurring on or after
October 22, 2004. As a result, a partnership that issues a capital or profits interest in satisfaction
of an indebtedness will be treated as having satisfied such indebtedness with an amount of
money equal to the FMV of the partnership interest (and realizing COD Income to the extent the
adjusted issue price of the indebtedness exceeds the FMV of the partnership interest). Note that
IRC section 108(e)(6) does not apply to capital contributions of debt by a partner to a
partnership. IRC section 108(e)(8) provides that any COD Income recognized by a partnership
pursuant to IRC section 108(e)(8) must be allocated to the taxpayers who were partners in the
partnership immediately prior to the discharge.
On October 31, 2008, the Service issued proposed regulations addressing certain items
associated with the application of IRC section 108(e)(8) to partnerships and their partners in the
case of a debt-for equity exchange. The proposed regulations create a safe harbor which, if
certain requirements are met, allows the partnership and the creditor to value the partnership
interest transferred as part of the debt-for equity exchange based on a “liquidation value”
approach.1 For this purpose, liquidation value equals the amount of cash that the creditor would
receive with respect to the partnership interest if, immediately after the debt-for-equity
exchange, the partnership sold all of its assets for their FMV and then liquidated.2 Liquidation
value can be used only if: (1) the debtor partnership determines and maintains capital accounts
in accordance with Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)3; (2) the creditor, the debtor partnership, and
the debtor’s partners treat the liquidation value as the FMV of the interest for purposes of
determining the tax consequences of the debt-for-equity exchange; (3) the debt-for-equity
exchange is an arm’s-length transaction; and (4) subsequent to the debt-for-equity exchange,
there is no redemption by the partnership nor a purchase by any person related to the
partnership of the applicable partnership interest as part of a plan that has as a principal
purpose the avoidance of COD Income by the partnership.4 If each of these requirements is not
met, the FMV of the partnership interest must be determined based on all of the facts and
circumstances.
The proposed regulations also provide that, except as otherwise provided in IRC section
721, and notwithstanding Prop. Reg. § 1.108-8(a), IRC section 721 applies to the contribution of
a partnership’s recourse or nonrecourse indebtedness by a creditor to the debtor partnership in
exchange for a capital or profits interest.5 IRC section 721 does not apply to the transfer of the

1

Prop. Reg. § 1.108-8(b)(1). The proposed regulation would apply to debt-for equity exchanges occurring on or after the
date that the regulations are published as final regulations.
2
Id.
3
There does not appear to be any requirement that the partnership liquidate in accordance with those capital account
calculations, which would appear to make the safe harbor available to partnerships that maintain targeted capital
accounts. In that regard, a Treasury official stated that the regulations were intended to have application to partnerships
using such an allocation approach. See, “Practitioners Question Proposed Rules on Partnership Cancellation of Debt
Income,” 2009 TNT 27-2.
4
Id.
5
Prop. Reg. § 1.721-1(d)(1). The proposed regulation would apply to debt-for equity exchanges occurring on or after the
date that the regulations are published as final regulations.
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partnership interest to the creditor in satisfaction of a partnership’s indebtedness for unpaid rent,
royalties or interest (including accrued OID).6
In addition, the preamble to the proposed regulations addresses the creditor’s basis and
holding period in the partnership interest. In that regard, the proposed regulations provide that
because IRC section 721 applies to a debt-for-equity exchange, the basis of the creditor’s
interest in the partnership is determined under IRC section 722. Importantly, the Service
expressed its belief that a creditor should not recognize a loss in a debt-for-equity exchange
where the liquidation value of the partnership interest transferred to the creditor is less than the
outstanding principal balance of the indebtedness by virtue of IRC section 721. Rather, the
creditor’s basis in the transferred partnership interest would be increased by the adjusted basis
of the indebtedness. This result for the creditor would appear to be inconsistent with IRC section
108(e)(7), which was made applicable to interests in a partnership transferred pursuant to a
debt-for-equity exchange and appears to contemplate the possibility of the recognition of a
deduction (loss) by the creditor.7 Under that provision a creditor who acquires a partnership
interest in satisfaction of a debt must recognize ordinary income (recapture) on a subsequent
disposition of that partnership interest with respect to any bad-debt deduction or exchange loss
allowed to the creditor.8

6

Prop. Reg. § 1.721-1(d)(2). Further, the proposed regulation provides that Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-2(e) and 1.1275-2(a)
apply to determine whether a partnership interest transferred to a creditor is treated as a payment of interest or accrued
OID, respectively.
7
IRC section 108(e)(7) was added to the Code in 1980 and extended to interests received by a creditor in a partnership
as part of the AJCA 2004. See IRC section 108(e)(7)(E).
8
2009 TNT 85-13 (May 4, 2009).
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APPENDIX IV
IRC SECTION 108(i) – FIVE-YEAR ELECTIVE DEFERRAL
OF COD INCOME REALIZED DURING 2009-2010
A.
Basic Rules. IRC section 108 contains a number of special rules of exclusion
that taxpayers may use to avoid recognition of COD Income that they have realized. Certain of
these rules are applied at the corporate level (where the debtor is a corporation, including S
corporations) while other rules are applied solely at the level of the individual taxpayer. If the
debtor is a partnership, the determination as to whether COD Income has been realized is made
solely at the partnership level. Once that determination is made, the COD Income (if any has
been realized) is allocated to the partners who, in turn, must ascertain the extent to which the
special rules of exclusion are available to them. If a partnership (the “upper-tier partnership”)
is itself a partner in a partnership that realizes COD Income (the “lower-tier partnership”), the
upper-tier partnership must, in turn, allocate such COD Income to its partners who (unless they
are also partnerships) must then apply these special rules of exclusion. In addition to these
rules of exclusion, the 2009 Stimulus Act added IRC section 108(i), a provision permitting a
taxpayer to elect to defer COD Income resulting from a reacquisition of its indebtedness, which
occurs in 2009 and 2010 (the “COD Income Deferral Rule”). This special deferral provision is
discussed below.
B.
Temporary COD Income Deferral Rule. The COD Income Deferral Rule
permits a taxpayer to elect to defer COD Income resulting from reacquisitions of an applicable
debt instrument by the taxpayer or certain related persons1 occurring after December 31, 2008,
and prior to January 1, 2011.2
An “applicable debt instrument” is defined as any debt instrument issued by a C
corporation or any other person if the instrument was issued in connection with that person’s
conduct of a trade or business.3 The term debt instrument, for this purpose, means a bond,
debenture, note, certificate, or any other instrument or contractual arrangement constituting
indebtedness (within the meaning of IRC section 1275(a)(1)).4
The provision applies only to a reacquisition of an applicable debt instrument. A
“reacquisition” is defined as an acquisition, by the taxpayer or related person, of (1) the debt
instrument for cash, (2) the exchange of the debt instrument for another debt instrument
(including an exchange resulting from a modification of the debt instrument), (3) the exchange of
the debt instrument for corporate stock or a partnership interest, (4) the contribution of the debt

1

For this purpose the determination of whether a person is related to another person is made in the same manner as
under IRC section 108(e)(4). IRC section 108(i)(5)(A).
2
IRC section 108(i)(1).
3
IRC section 108(i)(3)(A).
4
IRC section 108(i)(3)(B).
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instrument to capital, and (5) the “complete” forgiveness5 of the indebtedness by the holder of
the debt instrument.6
Deferred COD Income is includible in gross income ratably over a 5-taxable-year
period.7 For reacquisitions occurring in 2009, the deferred COD Income must be included in
gross income ratably over five taxable years beginning in the fifth “taxable” year following the
year of the reacquisition. For reacquisitions occurring in 2010, the deferred COD Income is
included in gross income over five years beginning in the fourth “taxable” year following the year
of reacquisition. Accordingly, for calendar-year taxpayers the five-year inclusion period begins in
2014 for reacquisitions occurring in 2009 or 2010.8
The deferred COD Income as well as any related deduction for OID (as discussed
below) that was deferred by the electing taxpayer generally will be accelerated in the case of the
(1) death of the taxpayer; (2) the liquidation9 or sale of substantially all of the taxpayer’s assets
(including in a title 11 or similar case); (3) the cessation of business by the taxpayer10; or (4) in
any similar circumstance (an “Acceleration Event”).11 The deferred items accelerate into the
taxable year in which the Acceleration Event occurs. If an Acceleration Event occurs under Title
11 or a similar case, any deferred items are taken into income as of the day before the petition
is filed.12 In the case of a pass thru entity, acceleration of the deferred items occurs upon the
sale, exchange or redemption of “an interest” in the partnership, S corporation or other passthru entity.13
The COD Income Deferral Rule is elected on an instrument by instrument basis and
once made is irrevocable.14 The taxpayer makes the election with its tax return for the taxable
year in which the reacquisition occurs.15
1.
Coordination with the Exclusion Provisions. Where a taxpayer makes
the election to apply the COD Income Deferral Rule, the exclusions provided by IRC sections
108(a)(1)(A),(B),(C) and (D) may not be applied, with respect to the repurchased indebtedness,
for the year in which the taxpayer makes the election or any subsequent year.16 Thus, for
5

While the statutory language refers only to a complete forgiveness of the indebtedness, a partial forgiveness of a debt
may result in a deemed exchange of the debt, under the significant modification rules, with the result that the partial
forgiveness would nevertheless qualify as a reacquisition. Further, the conference report provides that an acquisition
“includes, without limitation” the specific items listed above and in that regard would appear to suggest that other similar
transactions may represent a qualifying acquisition of indebtedness. See H. Rept. 111-16 at page 56. Similarly, neither
the statute nor the conference report specifically reference an acquisition of a debt in exchange for property (e.g., a
foreclosure event).
6
IRC section 108(i)(4)(B).
7
IRC section 108(i)(1).
8
Based on an assumption that the taxpayer does not experience any “short” taxable years.
9
Neither the statute or the conference report consider whether a deemed liquidation associated with a technical
termination under IRC section 708(b)(1)(B) would not be considered an Acceleration Event for partners that did not
transfer an interest in the historic partnership.
10
A circumstance that may arise in connection with a partnership that owns a single property that may be transferred
pursuant to a foreclosure event.
11
IRC section 108(i)(5)(D)(i).
12
Id.
13
IRC section 108(i)(5)(D)(iii). The provision does not specify whether this rule applies only in the case of a transfer of the
partner’s entire interest in the pass-through entity.
14
IRC section 108(i)(5)(D)(ii).
15
2009 TNT 85-22 (May 5, 2009).
16
IRC section 108(i)(5)(C).
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example, an insolvent taxpayer that elects to defer COD Income (or the partners of a
partnership that has made the election) may not exclude that income, in exchange for a
reduction in attributes, in a subsequent taxable year in which the deferred COD Income is taken
into income. As discussed below, in the case of a partnership the election to apply the COD
Income Deferral Rule is made by the partnership – which may raise competing fiduciary issues
where the tax profile of partners may support a decision to apply the COD Income Deferral Rule
for certain partners, while other partners may be eligible for and prefer the application of an
available exclusion.
2.
Special Rules for Partnerships. As noted above, in the case of a
partnership, the election to apply the COD Income Deferral Rule is made by the partnership.17
Any COD Income deferred under the provision is allocated to the partners in the partnership
immediately before the discharge in the manner such amounts would have been included in the
distributive shares of such partners under section 704 if such COD Income were recognized at
the time of the discharge.18
As discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this outline, a decrease in a partner’s share
of a partnership liability results in a deemed distribution to that partner, and would result in a
gain under section 731(a) to the extent that any such deemed distribution exceeded the
applicable partner’s basis in its partnership interest. In that regard, a partner’s share of liabilities
may decrease in connection with the discharge of a partnership indebtedness. If associated
COD Income is allocated consistent with the manner in which partners share a discharged
liability, the partners would generally not expect to recognize a gain pursuant to section 731
from the discharge of a partnership debt. In that regard, a partner’s tax basis would increase
from the allocation of COD Income in an amount equal to the deemed distribution resulting from
the discharge of the debt.19 This approach would, however, be disrupted by a deferral of COD
Income under section 108(i). To address the impact of the deferral of COD Income, section
108(i)(6) provides that any decrease in a partner’s share of partnership liabilities as a result of
discharge of indebtedness shall not be taken into account for purposes of section 752 at the
time of the discharge to the extent it would cause the partner to recognize gain under section
731.20 Neither the statute nor the conference report address how the “suspended” portion of the
deemed section 752(b) distribution is subsequently accounted for by the partner.21
3.
Special Rules for Debt-for-Debt Exchanges. If the taxpayer makes an
election to apply the COD Income Deferral Rule in the case of a debt-for-debt exchange and
OID is created in connection with the newly issued (or deemed issued) debt, then any otherwise
allowable deduction of the OID that accrues before the deferral period ends must also be
deferred to the extent of the deferred COD Income.22 Any deferred OID accrued during the
17

IRC section 108(i)(5)(B)(iii).
IRC section 108(i)(6).
19
Rev. Rul. 92-97, 1992-2 C.B. 124, provides that constructive distributions under IRC section 752(b) resulting from a
cancellation of debt, should be treated as occurring on the last day of the partnership tax year under the drawing rule in
Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a)(1)(ii); Rev. Rul. 94-4; 1994-1 C.B. 196.
20
Note, under this provision the partner would be expected to have a zero basis in the partnership interest as a result of
the discharge of the partnership indebtedness. In that regard, the partner may be unable to claim future losses or may be
subject to the recognition of gain as a result of other distributions from the partnership.
21
2009 TNT 79-12 (April 27, 2009).
22
Presumably this rule would extend to deductions associated with an applicable high yield discount obligation
(“AHYDO”) as described in IRC section 163(e)(5). In that regard, however, the 2009 Stimulus Act provides for a
temporary suspension of the AHYDO rules (which, if applicable, operate to defer the deduction of interest on certain high
18
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deferral period is allowed as a deduction ratably over the same inclusion period in which the
deferred COD Income is taken into gross income.23
4.
Temporary Regulations and Guidance Under IRC section 108(i).
During September 2010, the Service issued temporary regulations under IRC section 108(i)
addressing the deferral of COD Income and original issue discount (“OID”) deductions for
partnerships and S corporations, including guidance on what constitutes an applicable debt
instrument, what events will trigger an acceleration of the IRC section 108(i) deferral, and how
the rules apply to tiered partnerships.24 These temporary regulations expand on guidance
contained in Revenue Procedure 2009-37, released in August 2009, which explained how to
make an IRC section 108(i) election and required annual reporting of certain additional
information.

yield debt instruments issued by a corporation) for certain debt instruments issued during the period beginning on
September 1, 2008, and ending on December 31, 2009, in exchange for an obligation that is not an AHYDO instrument
(including an exchange resulting from a modification of a debt instrument). See IRC section 1232 of the 2009 Stimulus
Act.
23
This rule can apply also in certain cases when the debtor reacquires its debt for cash. If the taxpayer issues a debt
instrument and the proceeds of such issuance are used directly or indirectly to reacquire a debt instrument of the
taxpayer, the provision treats the newly issued debt instrument as if it were issued in satisfaction of the retired debt
instrument. If the newly issued debt instrument results in OID, the rule described above applies.
24
See T.D. 9498.
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